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Pretrial Detention and Punishment
Marc Miller*
Martin Guggenheim**t
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.
Chief Justice Rehnquist 1
When I use a word... it means just what I choose it to mean
- neither more nor less.
Lewis Carroll in 7rough the Looking Glass
and What Alice Found There2
Raymond Buckey, a defendant in the nationally publicized
McMartin Preschool molestation case,3 was detained for almost
four years without bail.4 Authorities held his co-defendant and
mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey, for two years without bail.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
** Professor of Cliiical Law, Director of Clinical & Advocacy Programs,
New York University School of Law.
t We would like to thank the following for advice on earlier drafts of
this Article: Morgan Cloud, Daniel Freed, Melvin Gutterman, Randy Hertz,
Graham Hughes, Howard Hunter, Andrew Kull, Howard Miller, Norval Mor-
ris, Edmund Novotny, Abraham Ordover, Ronald Wright and Franklin
Zimring.
1. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
with White, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ.).
2. THE COmPL=E ILLusTRATED WoRKs OF LEwis CARROLL 136 (E.
Guiliano ed. 1982). Carroll's character, Humpty Dumpty, unknowingly fore-
shadowed modern use of the term "punishment."
3. The case originally filled headlines as the biggest school child molesta-
tion case in history. Interviews of McMartin students - so unbelievable that
prosecutors wanted to keep tapes of the interviews out of evidence, while de-
fense attorneys hoped to get them in - suggested that hundreds of students
had been molested by seven teachers. L.A. Times, Aug. 9, part H, at 1, col. 4.
The children made repeated claims about rape, sodomy, druggings, satanic
rituals, killing of small animals, and explicit picture-taking, but local and fed-
eral authorities uncovered no photographs or other physical evidence of these
charges despite extensive investigations. Lacayo, Hollywood Tapes and Testi-
mony, TIME, Dec. 15, 1986, at 64.
4. N.Y. Times, Jam 19, 1990, at A18, col. 5.
5. A History of the Molestation Charges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at
A18, col. 5.
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Authorities detained Raymond Buckey on the molestation
charges despite his community ties and solid background, de-
spite the absence of any prior record, and despite the Los Ange-
les District Attorney's dismissal of the case against five of seven
original defendants after two years because the evidence
against those five defendants was "incredibly weak."'6
Authorities held Buckey through an eighteen-month pre-
liminary hearing - the longest in California's history7 - de-
spite the judge's dismissal of 80 of the 170 counts against
Buckey.8 They held him without bail past the beginning of
trial in July 1987 - four years after the state first filed
charges.9
After all that time, in December 1987 the trial judge finally
set bail at three million dollars.'0 Buckey's friends and lawyers
tried to raise the six million dollars in equity required under
California law, but failed." Exactly one year later, in Decem-
ber 1988, the court reduced the bail figure to one and one half
million dollars, and Buckey's lawyers pledged property worth
6. D.A. Won't Try 5 in McMartin Case, L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1986, part I,
at 1, col. 5 [hereinafter D.A. Won't Try 5]. The story noted that authorities
were holding Buckey without bail, and holding his mother on $500,000 bail. Id.
The judge set bail for two of the defendants (against whom the charges were
later dismissed) at $400,000, and for one of the defendants at $750,000. I& at
24. The Los Angeles Times editorial board commented in the lead editorial
several days later that "[e]ither guilty people are being let off or innocent peo-
ple have been unjustly and irreparably harmed." See also L.A. Times, Jan. 24,
1986, part I, at 4, col. 1; McMartin Flaw: Gaps in Evidence, L.A. Times, Jan.
27, 1986, part I, at 4, col. 1 (noting the lack of a single photograph despite testi-
mony by the children that pictures had been taken).
7. D.A. Won't Try 5, supra note 6, at 25. A full set of appeals on the
question of whether the children could testify by television led to delays in the
preliminary hearing. High Court Enters McMartin Case: Decision on Chil-
dren's Testimony by TV to Be Reviewed, L.A. Times, July 20, 1985, part I, at
20, col. 1.
8. 145 More Counts Dropped in McMartin Abuse Case, L.A. Times, June
13, 1985, part H, at 1, col. 3. The judge had already dismissed 64 counts against
three other defendants a few days earlier. Judge Drops 64 Charges Against
McMartin Figures, L.A. Times, June 12, 1985, part I, at 1, col. 1.
9. McMartin Trial to Begin, 4 Years After First Arrest, L.A. Times, July
13, 1987, part I, at 1, col. 5; Raymond Buckey to Testify in McMartin Preschool
Molestation Trial, Lawyer Says, L.A. Times, July 27, 1987, part I, at 19, col. 4.
The trial took longer than expected. Child Sex-Abuse Issues Still Stymie
Courts, Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1989, part I, at 1, col. 1; Cox, Trial
by Ordeal, NAT'L L. J., June 26, 1989, at 1.
10. Judge Halves Bail To $1.5 Million For Raymond Buckey, L.A. Times,
Dec. 7, 1988, part II, at 3, col. 5.
11. Id.
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three million dollars to bail him out 12 - almost five years after
he was first detained.'3 The judge noted that Buckey "has al-
ready completed the equivalent of a 10-year state prison
term."'14 In addition to bail, the judge ordered seven conditions
of release, including a twenty-four hour guard.15
Press coverage and commentary for the first two years
hardly mentioned Buckey's detention and never questioned its
validity. Only after dismissal of charges against five of the orig-
inal defendants did the Los Angeles Times remind readers that
Buckey was detained.'6 The article neglected to mention, how-
ever, that he had been detained for almost two years at that
point.'7 The article mentioned, but did not emphasize, the ab-
sence of bail.'
Almost three years after the case started, the Los Angeles
Times, in an editorial entitled McMartin Debacle,19 expressed
concern that a former prosecutor had said publicly that he be-
lieved the McMartin defendants were innocent.20 The editors
neglected to mention Buckey's detention, still without bail.2 '
In January 1990, the jury acquitted Buckey and his mother
of fifty-two counts of molestation 2 and were unable to reach a
verdict on the remaining thirteen countsU The news articles
12. $3 Million in Property Raised for Buckey's Bail, L.A. Times, Feb. 2,
1989, part I, at 3, col. 2.
13. Buckey Freed on $1.5 Million Bail After 5 Years in Jail, L.A. Times,
Feb. 16, 1989, part I, at 3, col. 5.
14. Judge May Release McMartin Defendant, LA. Times, Feb. 10, 1990,
part H, at 2, col. 1.
15. Judge Places Severe Restrictions Covering Release for Buckey, L.A.
Times, Feb. 11, 1989, part H, at 1, col. 4.
16. D. Won't Try 5, supra note 6, at 1.
17. Id.
18. Id. The paper did, however, run front page articles during the prelim-
inary hearing with titles like Children's Abuse Reports Reliable, Most Believe.
L. . Times, Aug. 26, 1985, part I, at 1, col. 1. Another article noted a $450,000
federal research grant to UCLA researchers to trace the psychological and be-
havioral development of the child victims in the McMartin case. UCLA to
Study Development of Victims of Alleged Abuse, L.A. Times, Sept. 20, 1985,
part II, at 1, col. 4. Press coverage of this sort led defense attorneys to ask for
a change of venue - rarely necessary from populous Los Angeles County. Mc-
Martin Attorneys Seek Relocation of Trial, L. Times, Feb. 23, 1987, part I, at
16, col 1.
19. L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 1986, part f1, at 4, col. 1.
20. Ex-McMartin Prosecutor Refuses to Answer Most Questions at Hear-
ing, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, part I, at 26, col. 1.
21. See supra note 19, at 4.
22. McMartin Verdick" Not Guilty, L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, part I, at 1,
col. 5.
23. Id.
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announcing the verdict ignored or simply misstated the history
of Buckey's detention. Three days after the verdict, the Los
Angeles Times ran a long, self-critical investigative story ex-
ploring allegations that the paper's coverage was biased in favor
of the prosecution.2 4 The paper failed even in this focused con-
text to mention the absence of coverage or editorial comment
on Buckey's prolonged detention, thus proving, perhaps, the is-
sue of bias at stake in the story.2 5 Even more astounding, the
New York Times stated on its front page that Buckey had
"spent five years in jail before he could raise the $1.5 million
bond."26
A barrage of media pressure led to Buckey's retrial on
eight counts. Again the jury failed to find Buckey guilty.2
Buckey's undoubtedly sensational case2 8 nonetheless serves
as an example of how far the law and the public view have
come in accepting detention. Buckey's case serves also as a par-
adigm of detention used to satisfy a community's demand for
24. Times McMartin Coverage was Biased, Critics Charge, L.A. Times,
Jan. 22, 1990, part I, at 1, col. 5.
25. Id.
26. 2 Acquitted of Child Molestation in Nation's Longest Criminal Trial,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at Al, col. 2. While the article did not correct its
error, it did include a separate time chart noting that detention had originally
been without bail. Id. at A18. The paper printed another article on the case,
however, focusing on, among other things, the panic surrounding the case
which, on the first page, again stated that Buckey "spent five years in jail
before raising bail." Collapse of a Child Abuse Case: So Much Agony for so
Little, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
27. Buckey Trial Deadlocks; Mistrial is Declared, L.A. Times, July 28,
1990, at Al, col. 2. After seven years and two trials, the D.A. announced he
would not seek a third trial. Id.
28. Buckey's case is sensational but not unique in pointing to the degree
of acceptance of detention. In a more recent California case, prosecutors
charged a woman with two counts of burglary after she "barricaded herself...
armed with 500 rounds of ammunition" in the home of an actress. The judge
denied bail, finding that the woman "posed a danger to the community." Gless
Fan Reportedly Planned Assault Suicide, L.A. Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at B2, col.
1 (emphasis added). The Los Angeles Times reported the story in a small
blurb on the second page of the "local news" section. Id. In a federal case in
December 1988, a magistrate refused to release on bail a 25-year-old suspected
computer hacker where there was evidence that he entered a National Secur-
ity Agency computer and planted a false story on a financial news wire. Sus-
pected Computer Hacker is Denied Bail, L.A. Times, Dec. 24, 1988, part II, at 1,
col. 5. The magistrate concluded that there were no "conditions the court
could set up... [where] the defendant would be anything other than a danger
to the community." Id. These cases show the extraodinarily low level at
which state and federal judges find sufficient threat to detain. They are ex-
treme only in the sense that they show how judges have become extremely
willing to detain.
[Vol. 75:335
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vengeance. In the context of pretrial detention, society has yet
to resolve the conflict between an individual's right to trial and
presumption of innocence on the one hand, and the ever-in-
creasing fear of crime and ever-slowing court systems on the
other. Following decades of detention and bail reform efforts,
the nation's criminal justice systems are in troubled times.2
The troubled state of detention and bail practice is the re-
sult of several interrelated factors. First and foremost, pretrial
detention is one of several intractable problems of the criminal
justice system.30 Detention decisions occur at a critical balance
point between government power and individual rights.3 1 Each
detention decision exposes deep conflicts between a deliberate
system of justice and the pressure to respond immediately to
threats to the social order.3 2 Detention practices also affect
other critical practices and rights: plea bargaining, sentencing,
punishment, and the right to representation and to a speedy,
public trial.33 Detention practice is one direct measure of a so-
ciety's view of the proper purposes and limits of criminal law.3
Second, public, political, and scholarly perceptions of the
purposes of detention have significantly changed since the last
major bail and detention reform movement in the 1960s. Then,
reformers sought to change bail practice so that judges would
use methods other than posting cash or a bond to assure pres-
ence at trial.s5 An important goal was to apply detention
29. See infra notes 44-47.
30. See Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail
Reform, 76 J. CRm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2-6 (1985).
31. See Alschuler, Preventive Detention and the Failure of Interest Bal-
ancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MicH. L. REv. 510, 520-27 (1986).
32. See Goldkamp, supra note 30, at 6.
33. See, eg., Thaler, Punishing the Innocent The Need for Due Process
and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 441, 456-
57. The power of plea bargaining in the pretrial process where the defendant
is detained is extraordinary, only 1% to 10% of all defendants ever make it to
the trial stage. A first offender detainee is more likely to be convicted and se-
verely sentenced than a recidivist with more than ten prior arrests who was
released before trial. Id.
34. See Goldkamp, supra note 30, at 2 (contrasting the recent reform
movement shaped primarily out of concern for protecting the public from po-
tentially dangerous defendants with the goals of the 1960s that focused on the
elimination of inappropriate detention).
35. See W. THOMAs, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 254 (1976) (surety bail
serves no useful function in the criminal system). The role of bail bondsman
has disappeared as an issue as the bond industry has disappeared from many
urban areas. See, e.g., M. SVIRDOFF, BAIL BONDS AND CASH ALTERNATVES 26-
34 (Vera Institute of Justice, 1986). In 1987 one of the few bondsman in the
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equally to the poor and to the wealthyss Now, prosecutors and
legislators unabashedly seek to use pretrial detention to reduce
crime and protect societyY.' The language of "reform" today
claims to be more "honest"-s about this use of detention.
The pretrial detention system in the District of Columbia
was the first expressly based upon the threat of criminality
before trial and sparked debate in the early 1970s over deten-
tion practice.3 9 This debate led to the unsatisfactory accommo-
dation between the individual and the state reflected in the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984,4 0 the Supreme Court's 1987
decision in United States v. Salerno,4 ' and the increasingly ex-
treme detention practices in many states.
This Article argues that the debate over detention has lost
sight of the fundamental values that necessarily define deten-
tion policy in this country and elsewhere.4 Its goal is to offer a
borough of Brooklyn in New York City had the sign in front of his window -
"Ba*l *onds" - missing two key letters.
36. The seminal work that pulled together all of the early bail reform
work of the 1960s and set the tone for the remainder of the decade is D. FREED
& P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964 (1964). See also W. THOMAs,
supra note 35, at 249-50 (general discussion of bail reform).
37. See supra notes 3-28 and accompanying text.
38. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3188.
39. That system was strongly supported by then Attorney General John
Mitchell. See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial De-
tention, 55 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1231-42 (1969) (detention of people deemed dan-
gerous to the community was constitutionally permissible); Tribe, An Ounce of
Detentiom Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV.
371, 373, 407 (1970) (pretrial detention does not enhance community safety and
violates the principle that accusation of a crime should not subject a person to
imprisonment). The court in United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332,
1341 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), upheld the Dis-
trict of Columbia system against constitutional attack. See Comment, Preven-
tive Detention and United States v. Edwards: Burdening the Innocent, 32 AM.
U.L. REV. 191, 195 (1982). The District of Columbia periodically serves as
more than host to federal lawmakers: It serves as a laboratory for federal law-
making. This pattern was repeated by the former 'Drug Czar" of the Bush
Administration, William Bennett, who chose to make the District the
showpiece and cornerstone of the national war on drugs. Bennett Unveils
Plan to Combat Washington Drug Crisis; Expanded U.S. Role Includes New
Prisons, Additional Prosecutors, Wash. Post, April 11, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
40. Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 203(a), 98 Stat.
1976 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988)). Congress also endorsed
the use of predictions of future dangerousness in detention determinations. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3) (1988) (allowing use of detained person's characteristics and
past history to determine if there are any conditions of release that will "rea-
sonably assure" the safety of the community).
41. 481 U.S. 739, 749-51 (1987).
42. Detention and trial policies have become a focus of international
[-Vol. 75:335
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theoretical framework enabling comparison of future detention
decisions with present and past practice and highlighting the ef-
fects of particular detention policies on a range of societal val-
ues, principles, and procedures. An extensive literature exists
on the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984,43 Salerno," on preven-
tive detention in general,45 and on detention in specific con-
texts, such as the detention of juveniles in Schall v. Martin46
and the detention of aliens. 47 This Article builds on the ex-
isting literature by focusing on several key aspects that remain
inadequately examined. 48
human rights accords. The United States does not always measure up to these
emerging international standards. See infra notes 302-04 and accompanying
text.
43. See, eg., Note, The Loss of Innocene: Preventive Detention Under the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 22 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 707 (1985); Note, When Pre-
ventive Detention is (Still) Unconstitutional The Invalidity of the Presump-
tion in the 1984 Federal Bail Statute, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1988); Note,
Detention For the Dangerous The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 55 U. CiN. L. REv.
153 (1986); Comment, Preventive Detention and Presuming Dangerousness
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 225 (1985); Note, Pre-
trial Preventive Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 63 WASH.
U.L.Q. 523 (1985).
44. See, ag., Alschuler, supra note 31; Comment, United States v. Salerno:
"A Loaded Weapon Ready for the Hand," 54 BRoOKLYN L. REv. 171 (1988)
[hereinafter Comment, 'A Loaded Weapon"]; Note, Crime and "Regulation":
United States v. Salerno, 48 LA. L. REV. 743 (1988); Note, United States v. Sa-
lerno: Pretrial Detention Seen Through the Looking Glass, 66 N.C.L. REV. 616
(1988); Note, United States v. Salerno: Destruction of the Presumption of In-
nocence?, 32 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 573 (1987); Comment, The Trial of Pretrial Dan-
gerousness: Preventive Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L.
REV. 639 (1989).
45. See, ag., Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor's New Clothes: Redis-
covery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV.
517 (1983); Goldkamp, supra note 30; Thomas, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial
Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 413 (1986); Note, Preventive Detention;- Danger-
ous Until Proven Innocent, 38 CATH. U.L. REV. 271 (1988); Note, Limiting Pre-
ventive Detention Through Conditional Release" The Unfullled Promise of
the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320 (1987) [hereinafter Note,
Limiting].
46. 467 U.S. 253 (1984); see, ag., Comment, The Constitutionality of Juve-
nile Preventive Detentionm Schall v. Martin - Who Is Preventive Detention
Protecting?, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 341 (1984-85); Comment, The Supreme Court
and Pretrial Detention of Juveniles: A Principled Solution to a Due Process
Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 95 (1983); Note, Pretrial Detention of Juveniles:
Denial of Equal Protection Masked by the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 95 YALE
L.J. 174 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Levy, Strangers to the Constitution: Detention in the Asylum
Context, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 297 (1983); Note, The Indefinite Detention of Ex-
cluded Aliens: Statutory and Constitutional Justifications and Limitations,
82 MiCH. L. REV. 61 (1983).
48. This Article does not offer a comprehensive analysis of the Bail Re-
1990]
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Part I explores the most recent twists in the detention de-
bate: the procedural novelty of the Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984 and the analytic novelty of Salerno, in which the Court re-
lied on the use of detention without trial at a variety of points
throughout the criminal justice, civil justice, and mental health
systems,49 including the juvenile detention case of Schall. °
Part I argues that the essential notion of punishment is over-
looked in the detention debate, and it considers the need for a
constitutional conception of punishment to replace the
Supreme Court's assertion that detention on the basis of pre-
dicted criminality is not punishment.51 Part I then considers
the theoretical and practical problems with the latest magic
formula in the detention debate - the use of predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness to determine who should be detained
before trial.52
Part II departs from current issues and identifies a series of
trade-offs that any criminal justice system must make in setting
rules for detention.ss Part II tries to identify essential decisions
distinguishing one detention system from another and to ex-
plore the current practices in the United States within this
framework.54
form Act of 1984. It points out the Act's key substantive and procedural
framework and compares the Act to its predecessor statute in the District of
Columbia. Nor does this Article explore the constitutional issues involving
bail in great depth. It does, however, explain the need for a definition of pun-
ishment given the Court's analysis in Salernzo. This Article addresses Schall
only to the extent necessary to understand its relationship to adult detention.
It deals with predictions of dangerousness only to the extent necessary to un-
derstand their use for detention. It addresses the right to a speedy trial, the
Speedy Trial Act, the notion of the presumption of innocence, and the right to
counsel only to the extent they are relevant to detention policy.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 55-135.
50. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
51. Readers familiar with the literature on detention might bypass the
discussion of the Bail Reform Act, Schall, Salerno, and the constitutionality of
preventive detention and begin with Part I, Section D on the meaning of pun-
ishment. See infra text accompanying notes 156-218.
52. Writers often argue from the premise that use of predictions of dan-
gerousness is never acceptable. We do not believe this is a tenable position.
See infra notes 219-95 and accompanying text.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 328-80, 405-13. Again, readers
steeped in the relevant case law and literature might focus on Part H. A. 3,
which evaluates studies of the amount of crime before trial, and Part II. B. 3,
which suggests non-traditional ways of restricting detention decisions by in-
creasing what we call the prosecutorial "burden of detention."
54. See infra text accompanying notes 204-468.
[Vol. 75:335
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I. PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE 1980s
The most prominent and widely discussed changes in de-
tention law and practice have taken place at the federal level
and in the District of Columbia.ss The procedural revolution
initiated by the Warren Court in the 1960s may be one explana-
tion for the increased reliance on detention to prevent crime.
The perception,56 if not the reality,57 is that the key procedural
devices created by the Court's rulings - including suppression
in state criminal proceedings of evidence seized in violation of
the fourth and fourteenth amendments,s8 suppression of state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,59 and sup-
pression of certain identifications unless the state could meet
the heightened burden of proof demonstrating reliability of the
identification:6 - have created a system in which final disposi-
tion of criminal cases depends more on the conduct of the po-
lice than on the conduct of the accused. This view holds that
reliance on the exclusionary rules at trial to protect individual
liberty has increasingly permitted guilty individuals to avoid
55. One recent example is the proposal in the District of Columbia to
eliminate pretrial release for everyone arrested on drug charges. This propo-
sal was in response to the crack wars and radically increased homicide rate.
D.C. Raises Drug, Gun Sentences; Council Action Will Simplify Pretrial De-
tention, Wash. Post, March 8, 1989, at Al, col. 1. (council proposal to classify
possession of illegal drugs with intent to distribute as a "dangerous crime" for
which suspects can be held in preventive detention until trial).
56. Bindinotto, Crime and Consequences: The Criminal Justice System,
39 THE FREEMAN 294 (1989); J. GRANO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS: A REBUTTAL TO MiSCONCEIVED OBJECTIONS 12 (Occasional Paper,
N.Y.U. Center For Research in Crime and Justice, 1987); Kannar, Liberals and
Crime, THE NEw REPUBLIC, December 19, 1988, at 19; Wingo, Growing Disillu-
sionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 583 (1971); Wright, Must
the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 737-38
(1972).
57. AMERICAN BAR AssocIATIoN, CRIINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 5, 11-34
(1988) ("[c]onstitutional restrictions, such as the exclusionary rule and Mi-
randa, do not significantly handicap police and prosecutors" from obtaining
convictions for serious crimes); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1036-38 (1984); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665, 742-46 (1970); Sunderland, Liberals,
Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343,
366-67 (1980); Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empiri-
cal Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Cm. L. REV. 1016, 1051-53 (1987).
58. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruled by United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
60. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967).
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conviction.61
For legislators and judges who think that the guilty go free
at trials for reasons other than the strength of the evidence, de-
tention upon arrest may appear to be a just counterweight. If
judges dismiss some cases before or at trial because of police vi-
olations, no punishment will be possible unless the accused is
punished upon arrest. Courts that dislike the procedural rules
of the Warren Court are likely to tolerate punishment of the
"guilty" somewhere in the process, even if punishment comes
before trial. In short, the meaning of the criminal trial has
changed over the past thirty years.62
Another explanation for increased use of detention points
to the bail reforms of the 1960s. To the extent that those re-
forms succeeded in decreasing the use of money bail, they
would prevent the sub-rosa detention of some defendants.6s
The release of these defendants may have encouraged legisla-
tors to find an express ground for detention.64
By the end of 1984, thirty-four states had express statutory
provisions justifying detention based on a defendant's alleged
dangerousness.6 Unlike the federal Constitution, many state
61. CY Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 230-31
(1983) (Warren Court due process revolution changed balance of power be-
tween prosecution and defense and encouraged negotiated settlements).
62. Bolstering the view that criminal trials have changed is the fact that
they occur less frequently. Compare Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal
Defendant's Right to TriaL Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 931, 938 (1983) (although commonly estimated that 90% of all
criminal convictions in America are by guilty plea, one 1979 study reported
that guilty pleas accounted for 85% of convictions in cases commenced by fel-
ony arrests but for only 53% of dispositions of filed cases) with Galanter, The
Life and Times of the Big Six: Or the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days,
1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 946-47 (explaining change in civil caseload).
63. W. THOMAS, supra note 35, at 223.
64. Id. ("[c]ommission of crimes by persons on pretrial release became a
major issue" after the Bail Reform Act of 1966); L. SHERwOOD-FABRE, AN Ex-
PERIMENT IN BAIL REFORm: EVALUATING PRETRIAL RELEASE SERVICE AGEN-
ciEs IN FEDERAL DiSTRier CoURTs 35-36, 39-40, 371 (Ph.D. Dissertation,
Indiana University, 1984).
65. See Goldkamp, supra note 30, at 15; B. GOTTLIEB, PUBLIC DANGER AS
A FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS 1
(National Institute of Justice Research Report, July 1985); B. GOTTLIEB & P.
ROSEN, PUBLIC DANGER AS A FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE - DIGEST OF
STATE LAWS 96 (1985). Some of the states follow the District of Columbia
practice and evaluate defendants for detention based on a combination of the
current charge and other factors. Most allow a discretionary decision based on
the use of physical violence in the commission of an alleged felony, while a
few rely solely on the current charge. See B. GOTTLXEB, supra, at 3; Note, Pre-
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constitutions originally included provisions mandating a right
to bail.6 In the face of demands for detention, however, a
number of states have amended their constitutions to allow de-
tention 7 and some state courts have read these rights to be less
than absolute.68 In recent litigation addressing the state consti-
tutional limits on detention, the appellate decisions have often
been cursory, and the cases have sometimes not even reached
the highest state court.69 Finally, as the Buckey case suggests,
the state level is where some of the most egregious detention
abuses occur without much critical comment,7o and state and
ventive Detention: Illinois Takes a Tentative Step Towards a Safer Commu-
nity, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 389, 390 n.10 (1988).
66. In 1963, Freed and Wald reported that 39 states guaranteed a right to
bail before conviction in non-capital cases. See supra note 36, at 2. In 1979,
one court tallied 36 states with a constitutional bail guarantee. In re
Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103, 105, 108 app. I (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
67. See Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Cour
and Democratic Accountability: Is there a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH.
L. REV. 19, 38 (1989) (10 states have added preventive detention amendments
to their state constitution). In 1982, California amended its constitutional pro-
vision, which formerly provided for denial of bail only in capital crimes, to al-
low detention for "[flelony offenses involving acts of violence on another
person when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court
finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial like-
lihood the person's release would result in great bodily harm to others." CAL.
CoNsT. art. I, § 12, subd. (b) (West Supp. 1990).
68. See, e.g., State v. Wassillie, 606 P.2d 1279, 1283 (Alaska 1980) (bail
clause in state constitution "does not afford a right to post-conviction [and pre-
sentencing] bail"); L.O.W. v. District Court, 623 P.2d 1253, 1258 n.8 (Colo. 1981)
(en banc) (constitutional right to bail providing that "[a]ll persons shall be
bailable" does not apply to juveniles); People ex rel Hemmingway v. Elrod, 60
Ill. 2d 74, 79, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840 (1975) (constitutional right to bail qualified by
inherent authority of the courts to manage proceedings); Mello v. Superior
Court, 117 R.I. 578, 585, 370 A.2d 1262, 1265 (1977) (where defendant violates a
condition related to risk of nonappearance or criminal activity, trial court au-
thorized to revoke release). Cf. State v. Cassius, 21 Ariz. App. 78, 83, 515 P.2d
903, 908 (1973) (bail guarantee not absolute in that it allows bail to be condi-
tioned upon variety of factors), vacated, 110 Ariz. 485, 520 P.2d 1109, cert
granted, 419 U.S. 824 (1974), cert dismissed, 420 U.S. 514 (1975). Contra
Shabazz v. State, 440 So. 2d 1200, 1202 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting trend
towards qualifications on absolute constitutional right to bail); Van Atta v.
Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 439, 613 P.2d 210, 217, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 156 (1980) (plac-
ing burden on prosecution in opposing "own recognizance" release).
69. For example, the California courts have allowed detention under the
new provision with only cursory review. See, e.g., In re Nordin, 143 Cal. App.
3d 538, 543-46, 192 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41-43 (1983).
70. States are often more politically homogeneous than the country as a
whole, and state courts and media respond more quickly to local political pres-
sures. Note, City Government in The State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596,
1598-99 (1965). In urban jurisdictions, the criminal justice systems are often
overburdened. McConville & Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New
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local detention practices have come to mold and define the op-
eration and limits of the criminal justice system.71
A. THE FEDERAL BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 makes protection of the pub-
lic the pivotal factor in determining whether to release or de-
tain federal defendants. The Act provides that defendants
should be released "unless... such release will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person ... or will endanger the
safety of any other person or the community."72
Congress originated the express use of predictions of dan-
gerousness as the basis of detention in its 1970 statute gov-
erning bail practice in the District of Columbia.73 However, the
District of Columbia Act gives the defendant many important
protections in return. The District of Columbia Act requires
the prosecutor to present evidence that there is a "substantial
probability" that the defendant committed the crime of which
he is charged;74 limits detention to persons charged with a
"dangerous crime" 75 or a "crime of violence";76 allows the de-
York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 652 (1986-87). The reality of
such courts has become so overwhelming that they may be easier to describe
in fiction than in careful, scholarly terms. See, e.g., T. WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE
VANITIES 116-36 (1987). These factors allow new, unfavorable practices to
evolve and yet be overlooked.
71. For example, pretrial detainees, rather than convicted defendants,
often push the prison and jail capacity beyond legal limits. Up to 50% of jail
inmates in this country are unconvicted. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS 1989, at 574 (1990) [hereinafter SoURCEBooK].
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1988).
73. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321-1332 (1989); Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-
677 (1970) (hearings on preventive detention).
74. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (b)(2)(C) (1989).
75. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(1) (1989). D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1331(3)
defines a "dangerous crime" as follows:
(A) taking or attempting to take property from another by force or
threat of force, (B) unlawfully entering or attempting to enter any
premises adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for car-
rying on business with the intent to commit an offense therein, (C)
arson or attempted arson of any premises adaptable for overnight ac-
commodation of persons or for carrying on business, (D) forcible rape,
or assault with intent to commit forcible rape, or (E) unlawful sale or
distribution of a narcotic or depressant or stimulant drug (as defined
by any Act of Congress) if the offense is punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year.
76. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a)(2) (1989). Section 1331(4) defines "crime
of violence" as:
murder, forcible rape, carnal knowledge of a female under the age of
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fendant to testify and present witnesses;77 places strict limita-
tions on the period of detention;78 allows the defendant to
appeal an order of detention;79 and places the case of a detained
defendant on an expedited trial calendar.8s All these measures
place a substantially increased burden on the prosecution to
make an affirmative case for detention and, if successful, to be
ready for trial promptly. The District of Columbia Act provi-
sions also require a high burden of proof - clear and convinc-
ing evidence - that the defendant poses a threat to the
community.81
Although supposedly modeled on the District of Columbia
provisions,8 2 the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides only
some of these protections. Evidence of other crimes may be
presented by hearsay, which is not subject to cross-examina-
tion.83 Defendants do not receive advance notice that prosecu-
tors will seek detention based on past criminal behavior;
therefore, defendants may not be able to adequately respond to
the government's request for detention. Whenever the govern-
ment offers the information about the defendant through an
Assistant United States Attorney and a proffer of evidence, the
Act does not require an opportunity for confrontation of any
kind.84
The class of defendants subject to detention under the Fed-
sixteen, taking or attempting to take immoral, improper, or indecent
liberties with a child under the age of sixteen years, mayhem, kidnap-
ing, robbery, burglary, voluntary manslaughter, extortion or black-
mail accompanied by threats of violence, arson, assault with intent to
commit any offense, assault with a dangerous weapon, or an attempt
or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses as defined by
any Act of Congress or any State law, if the offense is punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.
77. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(4) (1989).
78. The statute provides for a 60 day limit, D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
1322(d)(2)(A), but that period can be extended to 90 days upon the filing of an
additional petition showing "good cause." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(4)
(1989).
79. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(7) (1989).
80. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(d)(1) (1989).
81. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(A) (1989).
82. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3205.
83. "The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do
not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hear-
ings." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988). See, eg., United States v. Acevedo-Ramos,
755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1985).
84. See, eg., United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985)
("discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live testimony or
proffer").
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eral Bail Reform Act based on the community's safety is
broader8 5 than under the District of Columbia Act.86 The fed-
eral government can seek detention for any felony committed
after conviction of two or more federal crimes of violence or af-
ter "two or more State or local offenses that would have been
offenses" described as crimes of violence "if in circumstances
giving rise to Federal jurisdiction had existed."87 The Federal
Bail Reform Act creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of
detention whenever the defendant has a prior conviction in-
volving a "crime of violence" offense and the defendant was ar-
rested while on conditional release "pending trial for a Federal,
State, or local offense" and not more than five years has
elapsed since the date of conviction or the release from impris-
onment on the prior conviction.88
With telling candor, Congress expressly rejected the Dis-
trict of Columbia Act's requirement of evidence of a substantial
probability of the accused's guilt because this additional burden
was one of the "principal reasons" that the District of Columbia
prosecutors had made such limited use of the local detention
provisions over their first fourteen years.8 9 Less easily stated
but of great importance, the Federal Bail Reform Act allows a
final determination of dangerousness on what are essentially
intuitive and untestable judgments largely removed from the
proof of particular acts.90 The Act also fails to place any limits,
beyond those of the Speedy Trial Act,91 on the length of deten-
85. In the Bail Reform Act a crime of violence is defined as:
(A) an offense that has as an element of the offense the use, at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another; or
(B) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, in-
volves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4) (1988).
86. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1331(4) (1989).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(D) (1988).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(3)(e) (1988). The rebuttable presumption provisions
of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, while still fairly broad, come much closer to
identifying the particular concerns of threat from those on condition release,
and the provisions do so in a way that does not vest as much unwarranted dis-
cretion in the decision-maker. See infra notes 466-68 and accompanying text.
89. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADbaN. NEws 3201.
90. Alschuler, supra note 31, at 513 ('Then a prosecutor seeks detention
on grounds of dangerousness, dangerousness is the only issue for the judge to
resolve at the conclusion of the hearing.").
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
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tion, or any additional burden on the government to proceed
quickly to trial.
In the end, the "carefully limited exception 92 enacted in
the Federal Bail Reform Act and upheld in Salerno is not much
more than a miniature hearing with limited procedural protec-
tions to determine if any conditions of pretrial release can rea-
sonably assure the safety of the community. Based upon a
finding that no conditions would be adequate and probable
cause to believe the accused is guilty of the current offense, a
federal defendant may be detained until trial, limited only by
the flexible bounds of the Federal Speedy Trial Act 93 and the
distant bounds of the speedy trial clause.9
B. FROM SCHALL TO SALERNO
Twice in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutional limits on the use of detention to prevent arrested
persons from committing crimes before trial. The first chal-
lenge came in the case of Schall v. Martin.95 At the time the
Court decided Schall, Congress had not yet enacted the Bail Re-
form Act of 1984. Additionally, Schall involved juvenile deten-
tion - always an exceptional part of criminal justice.9 Despite
both of these facts, the Salerno Court used the Schall opinion
upholding juvenile detention as a stepping-stone to uphold
adult detention - a key issue of liberty for all citizens. On
close examination, this turns out to be a false step.
1. Schall v. Martin
For most of this century, preventive detention has been
virtually the universal practice in the juvenile justice system.97
Since the creation of the first juvenile justice system,
lawmakers in nearly all jurisdictions have explicitly authorized
courts to detain juveniles arrested for suspected crime when-
ever the court believed the juvenile might commit a new crime
if released.98
92. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
94. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
95. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
96. See supra note 46.
97. See, eg., D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 36, at 93-109 (describing ju-
venile detention practice up to 1963); Guggenheim, Paternalism, Prevention,
and Punishment- Pretrial Detention of Juveniles, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1064,
1066-67 (1977) (discussing current juvenile detention pratice).
98. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 36, at 93-109.
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The Court in Schall voted six to three to uphold New
York's juvenile preventive detention scheme.99 The Court first
considered whether detaining accused delinquents to prevent
crime during the pretrial period served a legitimate state inter-
est-i 0° In answering that question affirmatively, the Court em-
phasized both the state's special parens patriae interest in
helping children and a juvenile's limited liberty interest.' 01
The Court said New York's purported purpose in detaining
juveniles is "to protect the child and society from the potential
consequences of his criminal acts."'0 2 The Court held that
[s]ociety has a legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from
the consequences of his criminal activity - both from potential physi-
cal injury which may be suffered when a victim fights back or a po-
liceman attempts to make an arrest and from the downward spiral of
criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child,10 3
or as the New York Court of Appeals had said: "'protecting the
juvenile from his own folly.' 104
The relative ease with which the Court upheld preventive
detention in Schall clearly spurred preventive detention for
99. 467 U.S. at 254, 281.
100. IM at 263-64.
101. Id at 265.
102. Id. at 264 (citing People ex reL. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 689-
90, 350 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1976)) (emphasis added).
103. 467 U.S. at 266. The Court has emphasized on previous occasions that
children are especially vulnerable to influence by others and lack the experi-
ence and judgment necessary to avoid making poor choices. See, e.g., Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635(1979).
104. 467 U.S. at 265 (quoting People ex reL Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d
682, 688-89, 350 N.E.2d 906, 909 (1976)). The Court quoted at length from the
New York Court of Appeals' decision in Wayburn. Id at 265-66 n.15. The
New York court, however, went to great pains to distinguish juveniles from
adults in upholding a statutory scheme that would be intolerable as applied to
adults.
For the same reasons that our society does not hold juveniles to
an adult standard of responsibility for their conduct, our society may
also conclude that there is a greater likelihood that a juvenile charged
with delinquency, if released, will commit another criminal act than
that an adult charged with crime will do so. To the extent that self-
restraint may be expected to constrain adults, it may not be expected
to operative with equal force as to juveniles. Because of the possibil-
ity of juvenile delinquency treatment and the absence of second-of-
fender sentencing, there will not be the deterrent for the juvenile
which confronts the adult. Perhaps more significant is the fact that in
consequence of lack of experience and comprehension the juvenile
does not view the commission of what are criminal acts in the same
perspective as an adult.
Id at 265-66 n.15 (quoting People ex reL Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682,
687-88, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908-09 (1976)).
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adults. At the same time, the differences between the liberty
interests of juveniles and adults kept alive the hope of preven-
tive detention opponents that the decision in Schall would be
limited to persons who, as the Court noted in an earlier case,
"often lack... experience, perspective, and judgment."'1 5 At
the very least, opponents of detention thought it unlikely that
the Court would justify jailing adults on the ground that their
own safety was enhanced by being in jail.
2. United States v. Salerno
The hopes of those who opposed increased adult detention
were defeated in United States v. Salerno.1 0° The same justices
as in Schall voted six to three to uphold the Bail Reform Act
provisions enabling federal courts to detain suspected criminals
to protect the community from danger. 0 7
From one perspective, the decision was narrow. Salerno in-
volved a facial challenge, and therefore the Court could declare
the statute unconstitutional only if there was no conceivable set
of circumstances under which the statute would be valid.'08
Using this extremely narrow basis to decide facial attacks, the
Court would likely prefer instead to wait and declare unconsti-
tutional any particular detention order in which the defendant
could show that the state's interest in community protection
failed to outweigh his or her interest in liberty.'09 Yet the fa-
105. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
106. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), revg 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1986).
107. 481 U.S. at 740.
108. Id at 740-45.
109. In Salerno the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal pretrial
detention against an attack on grounds of substantive due process. IMi at 746-
51. One can make a distinct and equally powerful claim to unconstitutionality
under the procedural wing of the due process clause. This claim has two parts:
first, that it is impossible to establish and challenge predictions in the pretrial
context, see infra notes 219-95 and accompanying text; and second, that if pre-
trial detention based upon predictions is allowed, courts should require far
more substantial procedures than those provided by the federal detention pro-
visions.
Even if better procedures were introduced to govern the detention deci-
sion, research suggests that detention and bail decisions in the past have been
governed by the recommendation of prosecutors. See Ebbesen & Konecni,
Decisionmaking and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of
Bail, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 805, 819-20 (1975). The greater
power given to prosecutors under current federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)
(1988), is suspect for this reason also. This research emphasizes the impor-
tance of detention rules based upon consistent, particularized, and provable
factors. Ebbesen & Konecni, supra, at 819.
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cial challenge was exactly the way to raise the basic question
asked in Salerno: whether presumptively innocent persons
may be jailed solely to prevent them from committing future
crimes without an additional showing that the detainees are
mentally ill or otherwise beyond the control of the criminal
justice system. 10
Critical to understanding the decision and its central flaw
is that both the government and the Court readily conceded the
challengers' most basic point: preventive detention would be
unconstitutional if a court imposed it as punishment."' No re-
sponsible public official has tried to frame or justify preventive
detention as a punitive measure-m  The Court upheld the law
by accepting the government's contention that preventive de-
tention was not punishment, but rather was merely a regula-
tory restriction on a person's liberty imposed to protect the
community from danger."13
The Court stated that "[a]s an initial matter, the mere fact
that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclu-
sion that the government has imposed punishment." 4 On one
level, the truth of that proposition is obvious; if all forms of de-
tention were punishment, detention to assure presence at trial
would be impermissible. Indeed, the Court could have gone
even further to support its position by observing that detention
to protect the community from danger does not inexorably in-
volve punishment. For example, the state in exercising its po-
lice power may quarantine individuals afflicted with
communicable diseases for the sole purpose of protecting the
community from danger.115 The Court avoided, however, the
underlying problem of identifying circumstances that make de-
tention punishment.
The Court seemed impressed by the government's conces-
sion that pretrial punishment would not be permissible. Simi-
110. 481 U.S. at 747.
111. 481 U.S. at 746-47.
112. The argument that authorities should use detention as a form of sum-
mary punishment does appear in print, in some cases supported by respected
academics. See, e.g., Nagel, The No-Bail Solution, NEW REPuBLIc, April 24,
1989, at 13 (suggesting reform of the bail laws to deny serious offenders, in-
cluding "drug dealers," routine pretrial release).
113. 481 U.S. at 747.
114. Id at 746-47 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
115. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); cf. Minnesota ex
rel Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 275 (1940) (a state legislature may
select a class of individuals, based on members likelihood to pose a danger to
the community, and place members under appropriate control).
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larly, the Court was dearly taken with Congress's statement
that it authorized preventive detention to help solve the press-
ing societal problem of crime; e6 preventive detention was thus
merely a regulatory weapon for the "War on Crime." Echoing
Congress,- 7 the Court noted repeatedly the need to respond to
this "alarming,"" "pressing," 9 "compelling,' 120 and "particu-
larly acute" problem.' 2 1
The Court in Salero used a highly deferential two-part
test to evaluate the constitutionality of preventive detention.
First, the Court looked to legislative intent.122 Finding the in-
tent to be regulatory, the Court asked whether one can ration-
ally assign a regulatory purpose to preventive detention.=2a
With only a citation to Schall, the Court announced that
"preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory
goal."'124 Second, the Court asked whether detention is exces-
sive considering Congress's regulatory purpose. The Court held
that detention is not excessive to its regulatory purpose because
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows imposition of preventive de-
tention only when the accused is arrested for serious offenses,
and because the detention has at least theoretical temporal lim-
its in the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act.125
The Court's wholesale reliance on Schall to support the
rule that detaining suspected criminals to prevent crime serves
a regulatory, nonpunitive interest expands the rationale of
Schall beyond its context. The Court in Schall was answering
questions about the criminal justice system in the narrow con-
text of the juvenile justice system. Under the Court's jurispru-
dence, juveniles are presumptively unformed beings -
frequently immature and thus unlikely to be constrained by the
normal deterrent effect of law or to conform their behavior to
the dictates of the penal law.128 These differences both explain
116. 481 U.S. at 742.
117. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 ("alarming problem"), 6
("growing problem"), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &. ADMIN. NEws
3185, 3188.
118. 481 U.S. at 742 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3185).
119. Id at 747 (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Seass. 4-7, reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3186-89).
120. See id at 749 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
121. Id at 750.
122. Id. at 747.
123. Id,
124. 481 U.S. at 747.
125. Id
126. Sctall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-66 (1984).
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and justify the juvenile justice system, which operates without
the full constraint of the due process clause precisely because
the state's purpose is to help wayward youth.2 Because young
people are less mature than adults, they deserve a different set
of rules in the operation of a justice system.12
Thus, the rule of Schall cannot by itself explain whether
preventive detention of adults is lawful. In the criminal justice
system, the Court has never said adults can be jailed for their
own safety. Schall is no more relevant to the lawfulness of pre-
ventive detention for presumptively fit adults than is the law-
fulness of involuntary commitment laws for dangerous,
mentally ill adults (who are detained when courts find they are
dangerous to themselves or others).-3 Yet, the Court in Sa-
lerno relied exclusively on Schall in finding the regulatory pur-
pose of preventive detention to be valid.130
At the same time, Salerno suggests that the difference in
liberty interests between adults and juveniles might affect
whether legislation labeled "regulation" is actually regulatory
or punitive. In Schall, the Court noted that "juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some form of custody."' 31 In Salerno, the
Court noted that the unfettered liberty interests of adults man-
date a carefully tailored scheme.132 As the Salerno Court itself
observed, Schall upheld a preventive detention scheme permit-
ting authorities to detain any juvenile, accused of any crime. 33
The Salerno Court noted approvingly that the Bail Reform Act
was considerably more focused.'14 Thus, the Court in Salerno
recognized at least one critical difference between the juvenile
and adult systems. Preventive detention for juveniles is facially
constitutional even when the statute's reach is unlimited.13 A
statute authorizing preventive detention for adults might be
facially unconstitutional, however, if it failed to limit its reach
to persons arrested for serious offenses.
127. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-50 (1970).
128. Id. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
129. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
130. 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall, 467 U.S. at 269).
131. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
132. See 481 U.S. at 750-51.
133. Id, at 750.
134. Id
135. The language in Salerno suggests that the only precondition to juve-
nile detention is that authorities must arrest and formally charge the detainee
with the commission of a crime. Id
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C. THE CONSTITUTIONAITY OF PREVENTiVE DETENTION
Salerno involved two constitutional issues: whether pre-
trial detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 violates the
eighth amendment, and whether it violates the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 13 Succinctly
stated, preventive detention poses one core constitutional ques-
tion: whether the Constitution permits jailing presumptively
innocent persons to prevent them from committing future
crimes without any showing that the jailed persons are men-
tally imbalanced.
1. Eighth Amendment
The eighth amendment is the only part of the Constitution
that expressly addresses pretrial liberty. By its terms, the
amendment proscribes only "excessive bail."137 The eighth
amendment does not definitively prohibit detention in order to
prevent crime.138 Indeed, nothing in the text of the amend-
ment speaks to the justifiable grounds for detention. Although
many argue that the prohibition against excessive bail implies a
right to bail,139 that argument does not directly address the con-
stitutionality of preventive detention. The question of whether
a right to bail exists is analytically unrelated to the purposes
for which a judge may set bail. Even assuming that an accused
is entitled to release on non-excessive bail in all cases (except
capital cases), a judge is not prohibited by the eighth amend-
ment from setting non-excessive bail for the purpose of crime
prevention.14o
Thus, the eighth amendment is concerned with the condi-
136. Each individual detention decision can raise a variety of additional
constitutional claims based not only on the law in general, but also on its oper-
ation in a particular case. For example, even under a constitutional detention
system a suspect may be denied due process through the exclusion of relevant
evidence of appearance or danger or past acts.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
138. Commentators have taken a variety of positions on whether the
eighth amendment provides a general right to bail. See, eg., United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1325-31 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1022 (1982); Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bai" Historical
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 328, 329, 331 n.17 (1982).
139. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 969-71, 989, 1125-26 (1965); Tribe, supra note 39, at 399.
140. See Note, supra note 138, at 330 (eighth amendment command that ex-
cessive bail shall not be required has traditionally been interpreted to prohibit
a magistrate from setting bail higher than that necessary to assure defendant's
presence at trial). See, ag., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951); United States
v. Bobrow, 468 F.2d 124, 127 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tions that a court may impose. Nothing in the amendment or
its history speaks directly to the basis for determining upon
whom to impose conditions. Preventive detention is not special
because the conditions for detention may include the withhold-
ing of bail; rather, the special concern with preventive deten-
tion is whether a court may detain (or set non-excessive bail)
for the reason of crime prevention. 141
The history of bail under the eighth amendment surely in-
cludes some sub-rosa use of bail to detain individuals because of
their perceived dangerousness, although the extent of such use
may be overstated by those who assume it was widespread.142
The traditional denial of bail to capital defendants was not gen-
erally based upon a fear of dangerousness, but rather upon a
strong and logical presumption of flight.14s At the time of the
ratification of the amendment, magistrates could deny bail to a
class of detainees if the class was thought to pose a risk of
flight.144 Accordingly, the eighth amendment is a weak peg on
which to anchor the claim that a court may not deprive persons
of their pretrial liberty based solely upon the threat they may
pose to society.
The simpler approach is to avoid historical analysis and
take the amendment at its word: In circumstances in which
bail is set, it may not be "excessive." 145 Even if one goes fur-
ther and implies from the language that a judge must set bail in
all cases in which detention is a possibility, the central question
of this Article - which factors the court may consider in set-
ting bail - is still beyond the reach of the amendment.146
141. See supra notes 3-46 and accompanying text.
142. Judicial recognition of such a basis for detention is quite modern. See,
e.g., Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1163 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing several cases in
which courts have indicated that danger to the community may be considered
when setting bail), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478
(1982) (per curiam); Nail v. Slayton, 353 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (W.D. Va. 1972)
("A trial judge may deny bail if he feels that the release of the accused will
endanger the community.").
143. Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 687 (1985).
144. See Note, supra note 138, at 331. For the most comprehensive treat-
ment of the early history of bail, see E. DE HASS, THE ANTIQUITIES OF BAIL
(1940).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
146. The argument that the eighth amendment prohibits a court from de-
taining an individual without bail is unsatisfactory. First, from the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 the courts, in granting of bail in capital cases, have
been allowed discretionary power in the consideration of applications for bail
pending an appeal. Duker, The Right to Bai: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L.
REV. 33, 76 (1977). Second, the eighth amendment does not address those in-
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This Article focuses, therefore, on the constitutional pro-
priety of detention without further consideration of the eighth
amendment.147 Its concern is not whether a judge must usually
set bail when he or she wants to detain an accused, but rather,
whether the Constitution limits the judge in first choosing to
detain. The amendments most relevant to this inquiry (and the
amendments that the Court considered in Salerno) are the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, which protect individuals from
deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
2. Due Process of Law
The rule that the state may not punish an offender without
a complete trial and due process of law is the most basic consti-
tutional principle relating to criminal law.'48 Determining
when state action is punishment is not an easy task. At a mini-
mum, such a determination involves consideration of both the
purpose of the detention and its effect.
Preventive detention contains a vital attribute of punish-
ment; namely, it serves a traditional purpose of punishment af-
ter trial - incapacitation. 149  The state's goal of crime
prevention through incapacitation is central to the criminal jus-
tice system. The effect of preventive detention is identical to
that of punishment after conviction: deprivation of physical lib-
erty by placement in a locked cell.'50
Indeed, the most striking feature of preventive detention is
its capacity to swallow up the whole of the criminal justice sys-
tem.1' 1 If the state's interest in preventing future crime is suf-
stances in which detention without bail is permissible, and those instances in
which it is not. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
147. It is worth noting that the prohibition against excessive bail appears
along with the excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment clauses. This
shows that the framers recognized the close ties between bail and punishment.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See infra notes 416-66 and accompanying text.
148. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-46 (1979). See generally Alschuler,
supra note 31, at 532-33 (preventive detention is unjustified unless substantial
evidence exists of past wrongdoing or inability to control one's behavior).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (1988); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 458 (1965).
150. For these reasons, defendants are entitled in all jurisdictions to credit
toward their final sentence for time served in pre-trial confinement. See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(e) (1989). See also text at infra note 412 (federal
law).
151. In England's recent past, repeat or dangerous offenders received "ex-
tended detention": a period of detention under less-punitive conditions follow-
ing the term of normal "punishment." Authorities detained the offender after
the normal term based on what he or she might do if released. See J. HALL &
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ficient to deprive presumptively innocent persons of their
liberty, the state could incarcerate any person - whether not
yet convicted, not yet arrested, or even previously acquitted -
based on a showing that the person poses a danger to the
health, safety, or morals of the community. In United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, Judge Newman noted that "[ilt cannot seri-
ously be maintained that under our Constitution the Govern-
ment could jail people not accused of any crime simply because
they were thought likely to commit crimes in the future."' 52
Yet he observed also that "such a police state would undoubt-
edly be a rational means of advancing the compelling state in-
terest in public safety."'15
These observations do not prove that preventive detention
is punishment. Furthermore, we do not suggest that all forms
of state-authorized loss of physical liberty imposed to prevent
harm to others are punishment. Once state action appears to
be punishment, however, a heavy burden must shift to those
wishing to justify that action on other grounds. That inquiry
should take place not only in the case of preventive detention
used to protect the public from future crime, but also in the
context of other state-imposed deprivations of liberty. This Ar-
ticle next explores detention in a variety of contexts in order to
develop a definition of punishment that aids in sorting valid in-
stances of detention from detention improperly used as
punishment.
D. THE MEANIG OF PUNISHMENT
In Salerno, the Supreme Court used accepted instances of
state-imposed detention to bolster its conclusion that not all de-
tention is punishment.15 This section considers these and
other illustrations of state-imposed losses of liberty in order to
identify the constitutional meaning of punishment. This in-
quiry should be central to determining the constitutionality of
preventive detention. From this perspective, the Court's treat-
ment of the issue was woefully inadequate.
G. WILLIAMs, THE ENGLISH PENAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 12 n.5 & 214-16
(1970) (detention was allowed under the Criminal Justice Act of 1948, § 21, un-
til its abolition in 1967).
152. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1000 (2d Cir. 1986).
153. Id-
154. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987).
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1. Salerno's Benign Detention
A perspective emerging first in Schall and repeated in Sa-
lerno suggests that not all detention before trial is punishment
- that some forms of pretrial detention are benign or even
helpful to the person detained. Writing for the Court in Schall,
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the detention of juveniles was
for their benefit - they were clothed in street attire, well-fed,
and subject to education - and therefore seemed less puni-
tive.lss This perspective applies equally well to detention for
adults. Thus, Schall establishes the conceptual foundation for
viewing certain types of pretrial detention as not being punish-
ment at all.
The principle that certain kinds of detention are not puni-
tive is unremarkable. The notion that preventive detention
before trial and a finding of criminal guilt constitutes one of
these nonpunitive kinds of detention, however, is remarkable.
Yet, the Salerno Court reached the later determination with as-
tounding casualness. In making the determination, the Court
used an unsatisfactory standard, deciding the issue simply by
accepting at face value the purpose expressly stated in the leg-
islative history and labeling that purpose as "regulatory."'' 1 In
the Court's words: "Unless Congress expressly intended to im-
pose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction
turns on 'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restric-
tion] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative pur-
pose assigned [to it].' ,,7 It is not surprising that Congress's
stated purpose of protecting the community from danger satis-
fied this standard.
2. Failed Analogies to Other Instances of Detention
The basic, substantive challenge to any preventive deten-
tion statute is that the state may not jail presumptively inno-
cent persons to prevent future crimes because jailing them for
that reason constitutes punishment before trial.158 The Court in
Salerno failed to respond satisfactorily to this basic claim.
Although conceding a "'general rule' of due process that the
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of
155. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-68 (1984).
156. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-51.
157. Id. at 747 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1963)).
158. Id at 748.
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guilt in a criminal trial,"'1 59 the Court found a sufficient number
of "exceptions" to this rule to conclude that the statute did not
offend values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."l16
The exceptions that the Court listed in Salerno, however,
all fall short of providing support for the power to jail compe-
tent adults before they have been convicted of wrongdoing in
order to prevent crime. The "exceptions" listed in Salerno in-
clude the power to detain:
1) dangerous individuals in times of war or emergency,
2) dangerous resident aliens pending deportation hearings;
3) persons found dangerously mentally ill in civil proceedings;
4) persons found dangerously mentally ill in criminal proceedings;
5) presumptively incompetent juveniles accused of crime, pending
trial;
6) persons arrested for crime pending their prompt appearance
before a magistrate; and
7) persons arrested for a crime when a court finds the person
presents a risk of flight or a danger to witnesses. 161
The Court's list is not comprehensive; additional examples of
state-authorized deprivations of liberty include:
8) wartime or peacetime draft;162
9) compulsory education laws;163 and
10) quarantine. 164
A careful analysis of these so-called exceptions to the rule
that the state may not deprive an individual of liberty prior to
conviction demonstrates that they do not support the rule of
law announced in Salerno. Simply stated, only three of the ex-
amples listed above - detention in time of war or emergency,
detention of dangerous aliens pending deportation, and confine-
ment to prevent harm to witnesses - involve a finding by a
court or government official that the detainees must be de-
prived of liberty in order to prevent them from engaging in acts
for which they would be criminally responsible. For many ad-
ditional reasons, however, the examples do not benefit those
who rely on them to support preventive detention before trial.
159. 481 U.S. at 749.
160. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
161. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49.
162. Holmes v. United States, 387 F.2d 781, 784-85 (7th Cir.), cerL denied,
391 U.S. 936 (1968) (compulsory civilian service during peacetime did not vio-
late constitutional guarantee against involuntary servitude).
163. Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile
Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1180 n.87 (1984); Choper,
Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Rights, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1, 179 (1984).
164. People ex reL Barmore v. Robertson, 302 IIl. 422, 427, 134 N.E. 815, 817
(1922) (quarantine regulations sustained on the law of necessity).
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Persons found dangerously mentally ill in either civil or
criminal proceedings, presumptively incompetent juvenile de-
linquents, and persons afflicted with a communicable disease
all possess a common trait which the ordinary accused adult
criminal lacks: Each of these persons is presumptively not re-
sponsible for his or her future acts. Their detention is thus not
punishment for two reasons. First, the Anglo-American system
of criminal law is based on assumptions about the autonomy of
individuals and choice of action.165 These assumptions define a
just legal order as one in which the state prominently publishes
a penal law and its penalties and then intervenes whenever in-
dividuals break the law.'r These assumptions and the result-
ing legal order are inapplicable to persons not criminally
responsible for their behavior.167 For example, no law can pre-
vent a person who possesses a highly communicable disease
from being a danger to others. 16 8 Detention and quarantine can
165. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSmILITY 22-45 (1968).
Criminal punishment as an attempt to secure desired behaviour...
defers action till harm has been done; its primary operation consists
simply in announcing certain standards of behaviour and attaching
penalties for deviation, making it less eligible, and then leaving indi-
viduals to choose. This is a method of social control which maximizes
individual freedom within the coercive framework of law in a number
of different ways ....
IL at 23.
166. This legal order does not assume that such a system will prevent
crime. It assumes that some will break the law - that the promised penalties
will fail to deter. Instead of preventing crime, these assumptions justify pun-
ishment imposed only upon those who do violate the rules.
167. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (imprisonment
for addiction to narcotics violates cruel and unusual punishment clause be-
cause it inflicts punishment for a status); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
532 (1968) (distinguished from Robinson on the ground that one who is con-
victed of being drunk in public is not punished for his status as an alcoholic
but rather for an act in which he engaged).
168. Cf. S. BUTLER, EREWHON 95, 96-100 (1872).
Prisoner at the bar, you have been accused of the great crime of
labouring under pulmonary consumption, and after an impartial trial
before a jury of your countrymen, you have been found guilty....
You were convicted of aggravated bronchitis last year: and I find that
though you are now only twenty-three years old, you have been im-
prisoned on no less than fourteen occasions for illnesses of a more or
less hateful character .... You may say that it is not your fault. The
answer is ready enough at hand, and it amounts to this - that if you
had been born of healthy and well-to-do parents, and been well taken
care of when you were a child, you would never have offended against
the laws of your country, nor found yourself in your present disgrace-
ful position. If you tell me that you had no hand in your parentage
and education, and that it is therefore unjust to lay these things to
your charge, I answer that whether your being in a consumption is
your fault or no, it is a fault in you, and it is my duty to see that
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protect the community, but the simple creation of a law that
makes it a crime to infect others with a communicable disease
is meaningless. Similarly, dangerously mentally ill persons
and, according to the Court in Schall, accused juvenile delin-
quents are not responsible for their acts because the state can-
not prevent crime by waiting until such persons break the law;
the ordinary restraint of law is unavailing. Second, detention of
persons in these categories carries no moral statement about
the individual. The state is not branding them as "criminal";
instead, the state is identifying them only as "unreasonably
dangerous."
The Court's reliance on the practice of detaining persons
arrested for crimes pending their prompt appearance before a
magistrate is also misplaced. Detention pending a first appear-
ance before a magistrate is an appropriate exercise of state
power necessary to continue the processing of a criminal case
and to shift its locus from the police station to the court-
house.169 The deprivation of liberty involved to this point is se-
verely restricted in duration. 170
Once before the magistrate, detention to assure presence at
trial is also an appropriate exercise of power, at least when cou-
pled with a finding that no less restrictive means exist to assure
the accused's presence. Because the state may punish criminals
after it convicts them, it possesses the lesser authority to assure
that accused criminals will be available for trial and possible
punishment. The state may properly - consistent with com-
plete respect for the presumption of innocence - detain ar-
restees to guarantee the integrity of the fact-finding process,
without any finding, express or implied, that the accused is
ready, willing, and able to break the law other than not appear-
ing in the near future.171
Although wartime and peacetime drafts and compulsory
education laws involve to varying degrees a deprivation of lib-
erty, they share a common trait that eliminates their punitive
purpose: They are imposed universally on persons subject to
against such faults as this the commonwealth shall be protected. You
may say that it is your misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is
your crime to be unfortunate.
169. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1979).
170. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975); Llaguno v. Mingey,
763 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1985) (police officers held liable for holding arres-
tee in jail for 42 hours without probable cause determination); Bernard v. City
of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983).
171. Tribe, supra note 39, at 404-06.
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the law. Because all young men are subjected to a draft or re-
gistration and because all children are subject to compulsory
education laws, the government is not focusing on individual
behavior or responsibility. Without such a focus, punishment
does not exist. In enacting the draft or education laws, the leg-
islature simply makes a judgment that society is best served by
the law, not that the subject class deserves to be punished or
deprived of their liberty.
The only examples upon which the Court relies that di-
rectly implicate the authority to detain preventively are jailing
suspected persons in time of war or emergency, 72 detaining
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation hearings, and de-
tention to protect witnesses. Jailing suspected persons in time
of war or emergency, however, is hardly a helpful precedent
when applied to all adults accused of crime under federal law.
The Constitution explicitly authorizes suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in emergencies, 173 acknowledging that on limited
occasions United States law tolerates the existence of a police
state.' 74 The Court's reliance on this principle in Salerno to
permit jailing upon arrest in nonemergencies is, to say the
least, stretching the point. This precedent is perhaps better un-
derstood as the Court labeling the crime problem as so severe
as to constitute an ongoing emergency 7 5
Similarly, the power to detain dangerous resident aliens
during deportation proceedings is a very limited power author-
ized precisely because aliens possess less than the full breadth
of constitutional protection.176 In Carlson v. Landon,177 the
Supreme Court upheld this power, emphasizing that "[tihe
172. IV CicERo, PRO MILoNE ii (Loeb Classical Library 1929) ("law stands
mute in the midst of arms").
173. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
174. The use of the police power, or the failure to use it, has marked some
of the great debates in American history. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). President Lincoln's failure to properly suspend the writ has
been a continuing source of commentary and reflection. Halpert, The Suspen-
sion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by President Lincoln, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
95 (1958).
175. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (describing crime
as a "pressing societal problem").
176. The power to detain aliens has been at the center of both legal and
policy debates surrounding the treatment of the Mariel boatlift Cuban detain-
ees. See, e.g., Cuban Prisoner Riots Followed Seven Years of U.S. Ambivalence:
Despite an Intial Welcoming, Many Aliens are Detained Even After Prison
Terms, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
177. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). The Court relied upon this case in Salerno, 481
U.S. at 748, 753-54.
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power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political
branches of government... may be exercised entirely through
executive officers." 178 Thus, detention of resident aliens also
involves a type of suspension of constitutional rights.
The power to detain an accused based upon a finding that
the person would pose a threat to witnesses if released is the
only "exception" the Court lists that even loosely implicates
the power to detain to prevent future crimes. The narrowly fo-
cused justification for the detention, however, distinguishes it
from the law upheld in Salerno. Protecting witnesses is a text-
book illustration of a valid exercise of the state's regulatory
power to ensure a fair trial. The exercise of all reasonable
means to protect witnesses from threats, intimidation, and
physical harm is a necessary corollary to the power to conduct a
trial. A trial court has "broad powers to ensure the orderly and
expeditious progress of a trial."17 9 Protection of witnesses is a
separate, valid interest of the state, not to prevent crime in any
direct way (though of course that is a side effect), but to ensure
the state's ability to bring the defendant to a fair trial.180 Upon
a proper showing that release of the accused would endanger
the validity of the trial process, a court may detain him or her
without bail. Such detention does not constitute punishment.
Even if such detention were viewed as punishment, it is a nar-
row exception and extremely modest support for the shotgun
approach of detention to prevent nonspecific crime.
Having failed to identify the distinguishing elements of
these examples, the Court had an easy time stepping over what
theretofore had been a sacrosanct line prohibiting punishment
before trial (except in emergencies). The Court slipped past
that line because it failed to analyze with any degree of care the
examples upon which it relied. Had the Court undertaken this
analysis, it would have understood the unprecedented nature of
the power to punish upon arrest that it upheld in Salerno.
3. Exploring the Meaning of Punishment
In addition to misusing its list of "exceptions," the Court in
Salerno failed to explore in any serious manner the meaning of
178. 342 U.S. at 537. The Carlson Court ruled that Congress may establish
procedures, pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act, for the "deten-
tion and deportation of certain noncitizens, including members of the Commu-
nist Party... [who] may so comport [themselves] as to aid in carrying out the
objectives of the world communist movement." Id. at 544.
179. Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967).
180. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 668 (1962).
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punishment. Such exploration would not have been unprece-
dented.181 Courts have often been faced with the necessity of
determining whether a particular act of the government should
be considered "punishment" for purposes of the eighth amend-
ment or the due process clause.'82 The Supreme Court has
taken a variety of approaches in defining punishment, but Sa-
lerno is one of the first cases in which the definition of punish-
ment was necessary to the opinion. Yet the Court refused to
acknowledge the prior law on the question or to treat it with
the care it deserves.
Courts take one of three alternative approaches to the defi-
nition of punishment for constitutional purposes. Some cases
focus on the punisher's intent;las some on the effects suffered
by the punished individual;'8 4 and others on the legitimacy of
the grounds for the exercise of the punisher's power.las The
Court in Salerno relied on one version of the first of these ap-
181. See Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1668 (1980).
182. The Supreme Court has occasionally considered the meaning of pun-
ishment under other constitutional clauses. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 447, 456-58 (1965) (provision prohibiting service as officer or em-
ployee of a union if they are a member of the Communist Party "inflicts 'pun-
ishment' within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause"); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 287, 320-21 (1867) (striking down loyalty test
oath under ex-post facto clause). In Cummings, the Court noted:
The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed,
may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of
the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification from office may
be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon impeachment. Disquali-
fication from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of
trust, or from the privilege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an
executor, administrator or guardian, may also, and often has been, im-
posed as punishment.
Id. at 320. The newest arena for consideration of the constitutional meaning of
punishment involves civil fines, in which the Court held last term that exces-
sive civil judgments in the form of punitive damages are not governed by the
excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. See Browning-Ferris Ind. v.
Kelko Disposal, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2911 (1989) (leaving open the question of
whether the due process clause might limit civil fines).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 323-27 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
184. See, e.g, Lieggi v. I.N.S., 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd mem.,
529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976).
185. See, e.g, Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529-32 (1954). See generally
Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. Crr L. REv. 213, 215 (1959)
(evaluates and applies constitutional definitions of punishment formulated by
the Supreme Court and case law); Comment, supra note 181, at 1677-78 (de-
portation is punishment and to state otherwise creates a legal fiction which is
not in keeping with constitutional safeguards required by a democratic
society).
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proaches, a perspective that looks both at the punisher's intent
and the rational relation of the detention to legitimate govern-
ment purposes. 8 6 In doing so, the Court denigrated the notion
of individual rights that the due process clause is intended to
protect, and provided an unconvincing characterization of both
the effect of detention before trial and the magnitude of the
government's interest.
Seven years before Salerno, the Court examined the consti-
tutional dimensions of punishment in Bell v. Wolfish. 8 7 That
case concerned the constitutionality of conditions of confine-
ment before trial. Wolfish did not raise any question concern-
ing the legitimacy of the grounds for detention; the only
question regarded the conditions in which the detainees were
held. 86 The Court found that absent an express intent to pun-
ish, the conditions to which the state subjects detainees need
only be reasonably related to a legitimate, nonpunitive govern-
ment objective. 8 9 The dissent argued that the primary factor
in determining whether the state was punishing the detainees
should be the effect of the detention.i 9 °
Weaknesses in both the majority and dissenting positions
suggest why the Court must look beyond legislative intent or
simple effect alone. Of course, intent or effect can settle the is-
sue in some instances; if the legislature expressly states its de-
sire to punish, or if the effect is so severe,' 9 ' or both, then the
conclusion that the state is punishing the individual would be
difficult to rebut. However, most cases are more difficult pre-
cisely because a court can interpret the intent to be either puni-
tive or not.
186. 481 U.S. at 747; cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1958) (noting
problems with rational relation test).
187. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
188. Id, at 523.
189. Id, at 538-39.
190. Id at 568-70.
191. If the pretrial phase involved forcing the defendant to break large
stones with a small hammer or imposing a capital sentence rather than deten-
tion, the Court would presumably look beyond intent alone. Yet under the
Court's logic in Salerno, it could conclude that banishment instituted to reduce
jail populations is regulatory rather than punitive, and therefore, authorities
could banish a defendant after a preliminary showing that the jails were over-
crowded. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1981). The effects of
long-term pretrial detention may be sufficiently severe to cross the line and
become punishment based on duration alone. See supra notes 3-38 and accom-
panying text; see also United States v. Frisone, 795 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1986) (pre-
trial detention after 12 months solely on ground of dangerousness to
community is unconstitutional).
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Defining punishment simply on the basis of its effect is un-
helpful.192 It is overbroad because it labels as punitive a wide
range of situations where deprivations are permissable and
non-punitive. The complete concept of punishment should of-
fer relatively clear constitutional bulwark against the politics of
particular moments. Its definition must capture more than just
one judge's perception of the effect upon the individual de-
prived of liberty.
If, on the other hand, legislative intent is the sole determi-
nant of punishment, legislatures could circumvent rights ex-
pressly protecting the individual from government authority -
such as protection from cruel and unusual punishment and
from the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process - by obfuscating the real purpose of punitive legisla-
tion:193 truly a case of the fox guarding the chicken coop. Al-
lowing intent alone to govern leads to a tenuous and, in the
end, empty conception of liberty.1'
Nonetheless, intent - perhaps better described as purpose
- is an important factor in determining punishment. This Ar-
ticle has considered a wide variety of instances in both civil and
criminal law in which courts view detention as not being pun-
ishment. 19 5 In each instance, the basis for this conclusion is a
finding of a purpose supported unambiguously by independent,
established grounds for the government's exercise of its power
to detain.
At least three kinds of government intent lean towards a
finding of punishment: retribution, deterrence, and incapacita-
tion.196 In addition, the focus of the government's decision -
whether it is about an individual or a broad group - is a crucial
192. H.L.A. Hart has noted that discussions of the concept of punishment
tend to involve "some persistent drive towards an over-simplification of multi-
ple issues which require separate consideration." H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon
to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHmNT AND RESPONSiBnI1Y 3 (1968).
This Article is not an effort to find a universal rule for punishment, but rather
to suggest a working definition that applies to the range of situations of deten-
tion by the government to determine which situations should be considered
punishment for purposes of constitutional analysis, and which should not.
193. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRnVaNAL SANCTION 33 (1968).
The Court's ready acceptance in Salerno of the questionable statements of con-
gressional intent behind the Bail Reform Act of 1984 suggests that this danger
is far from hypothetical. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
194. Cf Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1976) (Stewart, J., con-
curring) ("the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State
says, or by what it intends, but by what it does") (emphasis in original).
195. See supra notes 156-80 and accompanying text.
196. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 527.
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factor in determining the government's actual intent.1' Pun-
ishment is a concept focused almost exclusively on the individ-
ual or on discrete groups.198
Some kinds of effects can also cross a constitutional line
and become punishment. The more severe and extended the
deprivation of rights recognized under the Constitution or laws,
the more the deprivation will take on the character of punish-
ment, and the stronger the government's justification should
be.
Preventive detention might constitute punishment under a
straightforward analysis of intent and effect. The intent behind
the new pretrial detention practices seems to mirror the pur-
poses of detention after conviction. The express goal of the
new federal pretrial detention is to prevent defendants from
committing serious crimes during the period before trial.'9
This goal is one of incapacitation. Pretrial detention is no less
punitive simply because retribution does not appear to be its
purpose.20 The Court held in Wolfish that detention may not
be imposed as punishment unless there has been an adjudica-
tion of guilt.20 1 Repeating the long-held view that punishment
for a criminal act can only come after a finding of guilt, how-
ever, does not make the identical intent or effect of the deten-
tion decision any less punitive.
Analysis of the effect of pretrial detention also bolsters the
view that preventive detention is punitive. Imprisonment is the
197. The constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, punitive legis-
lation focused on one person or a small, identifiable group, reflect a similar
concern. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
198. This is also the core insight behind the ex-post facto clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 3.
199. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
200. Former Los Angeles Police Chief Ed Davis's famous comment about
highjackers - "Give 'em due process and hang 'em at the airport" - suggests
that preliminary (pretrial) judgments can embody pure retribution. Martinez,
To Live and Die in L.A., L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 1990, at B2, col. 6. A retributive
strain lurks behind the desire to detain upon arrest. The often-expressed feel-
ing of injustice when an accused is released on bail and the victim is dead or
injured is based on a desire to see "justice" done immediately. The notion that
the accused deserves the maximum punishment possible (often expressed as a
desire that "they throw the book at him") carries with it the conclusion that
authorities should jail the accused upon arrest. The detention in the McMar-
tin Preschool molestation case certainly had retributive undertones. Because
lawmakers do not identify retribution as the government purpose behind the
new detention, this Article does not follow the easier route of arguing that
preventive detention is all the more punitive because it serves a retributive
purpose in some cases.
201. 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
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modem norm of punishment. The conditions of detention are
as bad or worse than imprisonment after conviction not only in
terms of physical surroundings,2 2 but also in terms of the im-
pact on the individual.203 The facilities and nature of detention
are rarely benign from any perspective. Pretrial detainees are
sometimes held in the same facilities used for those convicted
of crimes. When authorities use local jails for detention, the
circumstances of detention may be more unpleasant than de-
tention in prison after conviction. 204
In other contexts the punitive nature of pretrial detention
is unquestioned: Federal law requires that convicted federal of-
fenders receive credit for periods of detention;20 5 and federal
courts have required credit for detained federal defendants in a
variety of different circumstances regardless of the grounds for
detention.206 Federal courts have required medical and psychi-
atric treatment of pretrial detainees using the same standards
applied to convicted prisoners.20 7
The failure of federal courts to identify preventive deten-
tion as punishment suggests that the elements of punishment
available in current case law - purpose and effect - inade-
quately delineate acceptable and unacceptable instances of pun-
ishment. If a constitutional definition of punishment is to
protect against what is certainly among the most severe depri-
vations of liberty that modern, civilized governments impose on
202. See P. WIcE, FREEDOM FOR SALE 81-96 (1974). Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that much of Wice's critique of detention facilities remains relevant for
many, but not all, jurisdictions.
203. Detention before trial imposes substantial burdens on the individual,
inhibiting the possibility of a fair trial. See in~frz notes 451-54 and accompany-
ing text.
204. Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (convicted prisoner has
been "constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may
confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system").
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1988).
206. See, e.g., Vickers v. Haynes, 539 F.2d 1005, 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (credit
for pretrial detention for non-bailable offense); Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665, 668
(7th Cir. 1975) (credit for pretrial detention of indigent defendant even where
total of pretrial and sentence does not exceed the maximum); Hook v. Ari-
zona, 496 F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1974) (pretrial detention period must be
credited to maximum term).
207. See, e.g., Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986). The Supreme Court has held that the due pro-
cess rights of a pretrial detainee are "at least as great" as the eighth amend-
ment rights inmates possess after sentencing. City of Revere v. Massachusetts
Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). The argument that detention is for nonpuni-
tive purposes might be somewhat easier to accept if the treatment for detain-
ees were in fact considerably better than that of convicted offenders.
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their citizens, it must have more structure than the Court of-
fers in Salerno or in the Wolfish majority and dissenting
opinions.
4. A Proposed Definition: When Detention is Punishment
A definition of punishment should take account of the in-
tent and power of the punisher and the effect on the individual
being punished.208 The following definition is based on the
proposition that the state may impose punishment only after
trial and a finding of guilt.2°9 Building on the work of H.L.A.
Hart,210 we suggest a principled definition of state-imposed pun-
ishment for constitutional purposes including four criteria.
To be constitutional a deprivation must:
(1) involve a restraint on liberty or property otherwise enjoyed by a
free citizen;
(2) not be justified by a clear, substantial, nonpunitive purpose;
(3) be imposed by the authorized and legitimate legal authority; and
(4) be imposed based on a final adjudication finding a violation of a
law, or specific anticipated violation of a law, with scienter.
If a deprivation fits all of these criteria, it is constitutional pun-
208. See Thaler, supra note 33, at 450-51.
209. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Defining when punishment is
constitutional and when deprivations of liberty are not punishment is far
preferrable to defining punishment as mere effect and then explaining the dif-
ference between "acceptable" and "unacceptable" punishment. The former
approach focuses on the justifications for deprivations of liberty not constitut-
ing "punishment." As noted in the discussion of Salerno, see supra text ac-
companying notes 159-65, a number of important deprivations of liberty do not
involve punishment.
210. H.L.A. HART, supra note 192, at 4-13. Hart offers his definition of
punishment as a prelude to showing the importance of separating what he
calls "Definition," "General Justifying Aim," and "Distribution." Id He relies
on the definition to show the complexity of and variation in justifications for
particular punishments. Id at 4-13. The collection of essays, of which his defi-
nition is merely an introductory part, are part of his explanation of the role of
mens rea in the criminal law and of the notion of responsibility more gener-
ally. We seek different results from our definition; accordingly, we have
changed Hart's definition substantially, adding elements of responsibility and
judgment he sought to justify. Our definition of punishment is narrower; it
seeks not only to describe punishment but to limit it, in a constitutional sense,
to circumstances fitting within the principle that the state may impose punish-
ment only after conviction. Thus, using Hart's terminology, we include an ele-
ment of "distribution." This element of distribution - who can be punished
(and the secondary question of how much, which we do not address) - turns
on the notion of penalties imposed not only for "an offence against legal
rules," id. at 5, but also for an offense with a positive mental state (with scien-
ter). We add to Hart's definition, as well, the element of anticipated, specific
violation of law, though we acknowledge that this falls within the spirit and
purpose of much of Hart's discussion.
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ishment. If a deprivation fits the first and third criteria but is
justified by a clear, substantial, nonpunitive purpose, then it
does not constitute punishment but may be acceptable deten-
tion. If a deprivation is not justified by such a nonpunitive pur-
pose, and it appears to be based on a violation of law but
without that finding following a trial, then courts should disal-
low it as unconstitutional punishment.
This definition includes elements of effect and intent and
provides a coherent rule for identifying punishment. The defi-
nition turns on a combination of the effect of a deprivation, the
lack of a substantial nonpunitive rationale, and on what the
Court has consistently recognized as the core notion of legiti-
mate punishment: the state's imposition of the deprivation
based upon conviction for a knowing violation of a criminal
law.2 " The state must articulate its "purpose" to satisfy the
second element. In the absence of a substantial, nonpunitive
purpose, whenever the state deprives an individual - presump-
tively able to control his or her behavior - of liberty or prop-
erty in response to the individual's lawbreaking or expected
lawbreaking, the state is punishing the individual in a constitu-
tional sense.
This definition is consistent with the other instances of
nonpunitive detention examined in this Article.2'2 In each in-
stance, a substantial, nonpunitive purpose is evident. Thus,
wartime and peacetime drafts and compulsory education raise
no problem because the overriding nonpunitive element is
clear.213
Detention of accused defendants based on the threat they
pose to witnesses is less clear under the definition. In one
sense, such detention looks like punishment under the sug-
gested definition because the state acts on the finding that the
defendant is likely to commit another criminal act with crimi-
nal intent. This situation involves, however, a second, in-
dependent purpose: the state's legitimate regulatory power to
conduct a fair trial on the original charge. Without this power,
particularly violent and threatening defendants could create a
cycle of lawbreaking that would prevent the proper imposition
of punishment.214
211. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
212. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
214. Although the power to conduct a fair trial is an established, independ-
ent justification for detention, standards of particularity and proof must re-
strict the power. See infra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
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In other instances, a substantial, nonpunitive purpose is ev-
ident, and the detention is not based to any major extent on a
finding of past or future criminal conduct with mens rea. The
state detains juveniles and persons found dangerously mentally
ill because of their presumptive inability to make choices about
their actions. Under the proposed definition, their reasonable
detention is not punishment because of the lack of scienter.
Similarly, brief detention for processing at arrest is not justified
by a conclusion that the defendant has committed a criminal
act, with or without scienter. Instead, the state imposes such
detention (within proper limits) to ensure its ability to deter-
mine whether the individual has committed a criminal act with
the requisite mental state, and therefore, whether punishment
is justified.215
Detention to prevent flight is also justified under the pro-
posed definition for two reasons. As with protection of wit-
nesses and brief detention for processing at arrest, the state has
a sufficient nonpunitive purpose in the need to conduct a trial.
Because this rationale must be balanced against the obvious pu-
nitive effect, its power to justify detention is more limited than
in the other cases. Because detention based on a finding that
the defendant will flee is based on a finding of a specific antici-
pated violation of the law, there must be specificity in the fac-
tual basis for detention and procedural protections, such as a
higher burden of proof, to acknowledge and limit the punitive
character of the detention.
Finally, the remaining categories exist in an extra-constitu-
tional realm. Wartime and emergency detention do not permit
normal adjudication of guilt or innocence.2 16 Detention of dan-
gerous resident aliens is permissible because of their special
status apart from United States citizens.2 17 Detention operates
in these cases only by explicit suspension of the Constitution;
therefore, the proposed definition is inapplicable.
The proposed definition requires a positive, substantial pur-
pose to remove detention from the category of punishment.
However, the state cannot preventively detain a competent
adult without making an implicit moral statement about the in-
dividual; the detention order implies a magistrate's brand of
215. This rationale supports the minimum detention necessary to assure
orderly trial and requires that authorities implement detention to minimize
the necessary burden upon the defendant's trial and personal rights.
216. See PERSONAL JusTICE DENIED, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WAR-
TIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CiviLiANS 3-8 (1983).
217. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
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"criminal" or "putative criminal." Whenever a court concludes
that an individual is likely to commit crimes in the future and
therefore orders jailing, the court's finding is equivalent to guilt
after trial - that the individual possesses the requisite mens
rea to justify being jailed. In these cases, the state proffers no
purpose other than punishment. In striking down the juvenile
detention law subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court, the
district court in Schall stated this point with great force:
If incarceration under the statute were based exclusively on a
founded suspicion that the juvenile had committed crimes, no one
would doubt that this constituted punishment. To hold that it is not
'punishment' when based on a vague suspicion that the juvenile may
commit future crimes would render the applicability of the due pro-
cess clause in inverse proportion to the arbitrariness of governmental
decision-making.2 18
In ordering preventive detention, a magistrate rules necessarily
that the accused is ready, willing, and able to break the law in
the near future, concluding, therefore, that the individual
should be jailed. Humpty Dumpty notwithstanding, that's
punishment.
E. THE SCIENCE OF PREDICTIONS
Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsum-
mated offenses is so unprecedented in this country and so fraught
with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it,
even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of
such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
Justice Jackson, sitting as a Circuit Justice
in WilliamSon v. United States 219
Proponents of increased preventive detention under the
Bail Reform Act might choose not to dispute our understanding
of the meaning of punishment. For them, the purpose of pre-
trial detention is the "regulatory" goal of avoiding additional
crime before trial. The Court in Salerno validated this perspec-
tive when it found that "there is nothing inherently unattaina-
218. United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir.
1982), rev'd sub nom, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
219. 184 F.2d 280, 282-03 (2d Cir. 1950). The defendant had been convicted
of Smith Act violations for conspiring to advocate and teach the violent over-
throw of the United States. Id. at 280. He challenged the denial of bail on ap-
peal. Id. at 281. Although bail on appeal raises different questions, see United
States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 789-92 (S.D. Fla. 1977), Justice Jackson's
argument in Williamson applies with even more force to detention before
trial.
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ble about a prediction of future criminal conduct." 220
Bail reform advocates in the 1960s planted, perhaps inad-
vertently, the seeds for the use of predictions of dangerousness
to justify detention. In successfully attacking reliance on
money bail and bondsmen, the reformers recognized that
"[r]econciling the ancient right of an accused to bail with the vi-
tal need of the community for safety is a major task."'221 They
went on to suggest that "[u]nder a more rational system, ex-
plicit criteria might be formulated for detaining the individual
whose past record and present psychology strongly suggest that
he represents too substantial a danger to be let loose pending
trial.' '222 Lawmakers later took the hint about detention, but
ignored the language about the right to bail.223
The mistaken belief that courts can identify individuals
who are likely to commit additional crimes before trial is criti-
220. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (quoting Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
221. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 36, at 55.
222. Id. at 84.
223. The reformers warned that a detention policy would run counter to
the presumption of innocence and that "[c]areful and intensive analysis would
be required to assess the effects of such a policy on defendants and the trial
process." Id. at 84-85. While one can view the shift towards increased pretrial
detention as running counter to the reforms of the 1960s, one can also view the
shift as a functional response to the elimination of opportunities for sub-rosa
detention - detention now requires publicly stated grounds and application of
rules to offenders regardless of economic status. The legislative history of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 cites a 1981 Attorney General's Task Force suggesting
that the 1984 Act sought to correct the liberal release decisions resulting from
the 1966 Act's focus on economic fairness:
The primary purpose of the [1966] Act was to deemphasize the use of
money bonds in the Federal courts, a practice which was perceived as
resulting in disproportionate and unnecessary pretrial incarceration of
poor defendants, and to provide a range of alternative forms of re-
lease. These goals of the Act - cutting back on the excessive use of
money bonds and providing for flexibility in setting conditions of re-
lease appropriate to the characteristics of individual defendants - are
ones which are worthy of support. However, 15 years of experience
with the Act have demonstrated that, in some respects, it does not
provide for appropriate release decisions. Increasingly, the Act has
come under criticism as too liberally allowing release and as providing
too little flexibility to judges in making appropriate release decisions
regarding defendants who pose serious risks of flight or danger to the
community.
S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 50-51 (1981)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3187-88. This Article certainly does not ad-
vocate return to a system where detention is a de facto but unacknowledged
part of the process. Instead, it tries to identify acceptable goals for and neces-
sary limits on express detention rules.
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cal to the current expansion of pretrial detention. This belief
goes beyond the assumption that many suspects are criminous
by nature or profession. Rather, the belief rests on an expecta-
tion that experts, whether psychologists or statisticians, can
identify particular dangerous individuals from a class of sus-
pects. We are confident that the use of predictions of danger-
ousness will eventually be viewed as anachronistic to a sensible
bail and detention process - much like the current view of bail
bondsmen.22
To understand the problems with the use of predictions of
dangerousness at the pretrial stage, one must first examine the
increasing use of predictions of dangerousness at other points in
the criminal justice system. This analysis reveals that: (1) the
kind of predictions used for detention under the Bail Reform
Act and similar state provisions are not "scientific predictions"
that can be tested and challenged;22 (2) even scientific predic-
tions of dangerousness have a limited (though expanding) place
in other parts of the criminal justice system;226 (3) the justifica-
tion for using scientific predictions at sentencing or for early
release does not apply to detention decisions;227 (4) the accuracy
of predictions is in fact lower than policymakers assume and is
unlikely to improve significantly;228 and (5) there are insur-
mountable practical barriers other than just the low predictive
capacity to using predictions for detention decisions.229 These
arguments lead to the conclusion that detention based on the
use of predictions of dangerousness is punishment:230 Such de-
tention is not justified by "a clear, substantial non-punitive pur-
pose;' 23 ' it involves a great restraint on liberty; it is imposed by
the government; and it is imposed based on "a finding of spe-
cific anticipated violation of a law with scienter."'2 2
Few people in the United States would support detention
224. Freed and Wald quoted a United Nations study finding that "the
United States and the Philippines are the only countries to allot a significant
role to professional bail bondsmen in their systems of criminal justice." D.
FREED & P. WALD, supra note 36, at 22. The criticism of bondsmen, the use of
alternative forms of money bail, and the development of alternatives to bail
have led to the virtual disappearance of bondsmen from many major cities.
See, e.g., M. SVIRIDOFF, supra note 35, at 3-8.
225. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 250-65 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 260-65 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 266-90 and accompanying text.
229. I&
230. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
232. Id
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without any stated justification. There are many situations
where detention or imprisonment of individuals might have su-
perficial appeal to some - such as detention of black teenage
underclass males2 33 or imprisonment of antinuclear or antiwar
protesters parading during a Presidential address - but most
people in this country would summarily reject such detention.
Supporters of pretrial detention do not argue that authorities
should arrest and detain persons expected to commit future
crimes. Thus, detention is unjustified in the absence of arrest
even if the prediction of a violent criminal act is at a level of
accuracy - say three out of four - far above current acheive-
able levels.23
Even proponents of detention based on dangerousness
agree that the arrest and charge combined with the prediction
- not the arrest and charge alone - justify the detention.235
For all but the most violent crimes, they would reject the asser-
tion that the state could constitutionally detain all those ar-
rested and charged on the basis of the arrest and charge alone.
Detention based on a prediction relies on two assumptions:
that the suspect is guilty of the crime charged236 (because with-
out this assumption the state could not detain the defendant
without suspending the Constitution), and that the prediction
characterizes adequately the kind and degree of threat justify-
ing detention. Proponents do not explain, however, why or
how a prediction of dangerousness or criminality 37 justifies
233. Black teenage underclass males are mentioned because of the statisti-
cally high rate of criminality among this group. See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENC-
ING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 90 (1983). In certain urban areas in the United
States, criminologists claim to be able to make powerful assessments of the
likelihood of criminality (not necessarily violent criminality) based on knowl-
edge of date of birth, sex, and address. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 547.
234. See infra note 288 and accompanying text; see also Gottfredson, Pre-
diction: An Overview of Selected Methodological Issues, in PREDICTION AND
CLASSIFICATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE DECISION MAKING 33-38 (1987) [hereinafter
PREDICTION AND CLASSIFICATION].
235. See Mitchell, supra note 39, at 1235-39.
236. Another way of viewing detention on the basis of prediction is that the
fact of arrest, combined with the defendant's prior record, poses a sufficient
threat. Because federal law imposes detention on individuals rather than on a
class, some additional element must exist - in this case relegated to the total
discretion of the judge and prosecutor. A decision to detain all of a class of
defendants based on the combination of arrest and record would raise differ-
ent questions. These are addressed in another part of this Article. See infra
text accompanying notes 242-47.
237. Although the two are often merged, predictions of future violence dif-
fer from predictions of future criminality. Discussions with prosecutors using
the federal detention provisions suggest, unfortunately, that prosecutors and
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treating a person as if he or she is guilty before a court makes a
formal determination of guilt.
1. Nonscientific Predictions Under the Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1984
In debates on the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress
avoided most of the difficult issues raised by the use of predic-
tions of future criminality. The legislative history suggests that
"neither the experience under the District of Columbia deten-
tion statute nor empirical analysis" settles the issue of whether
anyone can predict future dangerousness.M The legislative his-
tory concluded, however, that "certain combinations of offense
and offender characteristics..." have been shown in studies to
have a strong positive relationship to predicting the probability
that a defendant will commit a new offense while on release,"
and that "judges can... make such predictions with an accepta-
ble level of accuracy."' 9
Even these few bare statements show an unresolved con-
flict. Assume for the moment that "studies" have in fact shown
"a strong positive relation" between "certain combinations of
offense and offender characteristics" and pretrial criminality.
Congress still does not justify giving judges discretion in mak-
judges assume dangerousness and criminality are synonymous. Criminality is
a broad, unstructured concept. It includes bath nonviolent and violent of-
fenses against property and persons. The type of predicted criminality is one
of the major sources for the wide difference in predictive studies used to bol-
ster or question detention practices. See infra notes 268-70 and accompanying
text. For the purposes of this Article, several generalizations are important:
(1) nonviolent property offenses may be predicted at much higher levels than
violent offenses, or than violence generally, but such relatively minor behav-
ior, even if proven, is a weak foundation on which to build a justification for
detention to "protect the community"; (2) the "dark figures" (unreported and
unproven allegations) of property and less violent offenses are much higher
than for violent offenses, and the inclination to presume guilt is stronger; (3)
property and less violent offenses can be handled more quickly in the criminal
justice system and do not raise the same perceived need for detention before
final adjudication. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 518, 534. We do not mean
by these points to denigrate the unwelcome impact of any crime, and we recog-
nize that some property and less violent offenses, such as home burglary, raise
greater detention concerns. See Miller & Morris, Predictions of Dangerous-
ness: Ethical Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHcs &
PUB. POL'Y 393, 402-03 (1986). As an analytical matter, however, discussion of
detention must focus on the real and perceived threats of the kind of violent
crimes against persons that are reported in the papers, repeated in legislatures,
and that drive the calls for "reform."
238. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3182, 3192.
239. Id.
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ing the detention decision. Congress does not explain why
judges have the ability to "make... predictions with an accept-
able level of accuracy." Nor does Congress specify what consti-
tutes an acceptable level of accuracy.
These gaps in the rationale behind predictions of danger-
ousness imply that Congress did not fully comprehend the dif-
ference between "scientific" and "clinical" predictions. One can
also infer that Congress did not want to set a specific level of
required accuracym° because any reasonable level of accuracy is
unobtainable given present and plausible-future abilities to pre-
dict violent crime.241
The recent literature on the use of predictions of danger-
ousness suggests that several kinds of predictions exist.2A The
most accurate predictions - and the type that can be most eas-
ily tested, verified, and challenged - are based on statistical or
actuarial methods applied to largely objective criteria such as
age, criminal record, employment, and education.243 Experts
increasingly accept statistical predictions of dangerousness as a
tool to assist decisionmaking throughout the criminal justice
system - in part because of their scientific aura, but also be-
240. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows the government to move for de-
tention in any case involving a crime of violence, or a federal drug offense car-
rying a penalty of ten years or more, or any felony following convictions on
two or more offenses of these types, or an offense carrying a penalty of life
imprisonment or death, or two or more comparable state or local offenses, or a
combination of such offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988). Functional standards
would require Congress to be more specific. For example, Congress should ad-
dress whether a prediction that the defendant will commit an offense much
less serious than the charged offense, perhaps something as minor as driving
without a license, should be a sufficient prediction of "dangerousness" to jus-
tify detention. The same unaddressed question - the legitimacy of refering to
crimes generally, rather than to specific criminal behavior - helps to explain
the statistics claiming a high degree of pretrial crime - the basis for the Bail
Reform Act of 1984. See infra notes 374-78 and accompanying text.
241. Tonry, Prediction and Classiffwation: Legal and Ethical Issues, in
PREDICTION AND CLASSinCATION, supra note 234, at 393-94. One of the au-
thors of this Article wrote as an afterword to an article published in 1984 that
the Bail Reform Act of 1984's pretrial prevention provisions, "although loosely
structured,... [are] a step toward the honest administration of pretrial deten-
tion." Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND Jus-
TICE: AN ANNuAL REvIEw OF RESEARCH 49 (1985). That judgment was meant
to praise Congress's willingness to acknowledge the express use of predictions.
It was a hasty judgment and is hereby rejected for the reasons explained in
this Article.
242. See Miller & Morris, supra note 237, at 403-06; Tonry, supra note 241,
at 395.
243. Miller & Morris, supra note 237, at 405, 425, 434-36; Gottfredson, supra
note 234, at 36-37.
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cause they can improve or assist with many of the difficult deci-
sions in the system which judges now make poorly.24 Studies
indicate that the use of statistical predictions can improve on
decisionmakers' highly inaccurate intuitive assessments - at
least for certain decisions, including bail decisions.m
"Clinical" predictions - predictions of an expert with
claimed ability to identify a characteristic through special in-
sight - tend to be less accurate than statistical predictions.M
Equally important for purposes of a detention decision, such
predictions are not easily challenged because they rely on the
expertise and insights of one individual. A clinical prediction
can be "tested" by the past success of the expert making the
prediction, but this does not guarantee that the prediction is
equally accurate when applied to a new case. The very nature
of clinical predictions suggests they are largely immune to legal
review.
The imprecise standards governing predictions under the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 give detention decisions the
character of clinical decisions.2 4 7 A judge's finding that a de-
fendant "will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community"24 cannot be called a scientific determination. Yet
the Act empowers a judge to reach this conclusion whenever a
case involves a broadly defined "crime of violence" or "any fel-
ony" coupled with certain prior convictions - without any ad-
ditional finding beyond probable cause for the charged offense
and without the protection of the rules of evidence.2 4 9
Fundamental problems would remain even if the Bail Re-
form Act did require that predictions of dangerousness be based
on provable, objective factors and have an actuarial basis. The
government should not use predictions to justify state action
that could not otherwise be justified. Judges should only use
244. See infra notes 250-65 and accompanying text.
245. See Gottfredson, supra note 234, at 36-37; Miller, Legal and Ethical
Limits on the Use of Predictions of Dangerousness in the Criminal Law, in
THE PREDICTION OF CRIINAL VIOLENCE 35, 42 (1986) [hereinafter CRnINAL
VIOLENCE]; see also Gottfredson, Gottfredson & Conly, Stakes and Risk In-
capacitative Intent in Sentencing Decisions, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 91, 103-04
(1989) (study found that most guidelines could be enhanced by the inclusion of
empirically based measures).
246. See Farrington & Tarling, Criminological Prediction An Introduc-
tion, in PREDICTION IN CRIMINOLOGY (1985); J. FLOUD & W. YOUNG, DANGER-
OUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JusTICE 27 (1981).
247. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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prediction to distribute punishment or guide decision-making
within otherwise justified ranges. Pretrial detention on the ba-
sis of predictions fails because without the prediction and an as-
sumption of guilt, the detention is invalid. To elaborate on this
point, the next section explores the use of predictions for deci-
sions not involving detention.
2. Detention Compared to Other Uses of Predictions
Acceptance of predictions of dangerousness is increasing in
a number of contexts, particularly in the context of sentenc-
ing.2 -O Experts agree that virtually every sentencing decision
involves prediction; in the words of Justice John Paul Stevens:
"any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's
probable future conduct when it engages in the process of de-
termining what punishment to impose."25' 1
In recent years the Supreme Court has shown broad sup-
port for the use of predictions of dangerousness in even ex-
treme circumstances. In Barefoot v. Estelle,252 the Court
upheld the use of clinical predictions of dangerousness in decid-
ing whether to sentence the defendant to death.253 In Jones v.
United States,2 the Court upheld a sentence based on the fu-
ture dangerousness of an individual who pleaded not guilty by
reason of insanity, even though the term might extend beyond
the possible criminal sentence and beyond the otherwise appli-
cable period of civil commitment.255
Both Barefoot and Jones indicate the Court's broad accept-
ance of the use of predictions of dangerousness in making fun-
damental decisions about individual liberty. Both may be
criticized for upholding improper uses of predictions.25 6 But
250. See Petersilia & Turner, Guideline-based Justice: Prediction and Ra-
cial Minorities, in PREDICTIONS AND CLASSIFICATION, supra note 234, at 155-60;
Miller & Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: An Argument for Limited
Use, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMs 263 (1988) (citing articles).
251. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976).
252. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
253. Texas law allows a capital sentence under a finding that "there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981). The Court upheld the Texas statute and
the sentence under it, which was based upon psychiatric testimony supported
only by the expertise of the doctors. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 905, 906.
254. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
255. Id at 370.
256. Miller & Morris, supra note 250, at 270.
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the use of predictions of dangerousness to justify pretrial deten-
tion is a significant step beyond these decisions.
The Court in Salerno relied upon the general acceptance of
the use of predictions in other areas to justify their use in de-
tention decisions.2 7 The Court wrongly assumed that all uses
of predictions are the same,25s when in fact this was precisely
the issue before the Court. In allowing certain clinical evalua-
tions into evidence, the Barefoot Court did not hold that all
uses of predictions are acceptable. In addition, the Court as-
sumed that all predictions are the same.259 The Court erred in
both respects.
The use of predictions of dangerousness for detention is
different from most other uses of predictions in the criminal
justice system.2 ° Predictions have spread throughout the sys-
tem without careful consideration of the proper boundaries for
this tool. The use of relative predictions of dangerousness 26 1 to
distribute punishment within previously accepted ranges of
punishment must be distinguished from the use of predictions
to justify new, unprecedented actions. The first kind of predic-
tion is a "customary" use of predictions, while the second is an
"exceptional" or "extraordinary" use.262
The heart of the distinction between customary and excep-
tional uses lies in the justification for the state action in ques-
tion. When the use is customary, the state could have acted
without predictions. The state "customarily" uses predictions
to distribute loss of liberty across a spectrum justified by the
preexisting relationship between the individual and the state -
257. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
258. Id. at 751-52. See generally Miller & Morris, supra note 242, at 422-31
(discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of predictions of dangerousness).
259. Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983).
260. Alschuler, supra note 31, at 532-33; Miller & Morris, supra note 250, at
263, 265.
261. A relative prediction of dangerousness is a prediction of the danger-
ousness of a member or part of a group based on the base rate for the group.
Relative predictions of dangerousness can hide more precise predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness. For example, a prediction at an absolute group rate that
might appear low (say one in four of a violent act over two years) may in fact
show a member or part of a group (such as those accused of aggravated as-
sault) that is many times more likely to be violent than other members of the
group.
262. See Miller & Morris, supra note 237, at 432; Miller, supra note 245, at
37-38; see also Gottfredson, Prediction and Classification in Criminal Justice
Decision Making, in PREDICION AND CLASSIFICATION, supra note 234, at 2-3
(discussing types of predictions).
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whether as a suspect, a defendant, or a convicted criminal.263 If
predictions improve on the identical but untutored judgments
made before the use of predictions, justice may be increased.
An error in applying the prediction violates no fundamental
principle of justice (unless the prediction is arbitrary) because
the punishment or other state action was justified without the
prediction. When a range of punishment is already authorized
for a class of individuals, a judge's use of predictions only fine-
tunes the decision made within the authorized range.
The lack of predictive ability matters more when the pre-
diction itself serves as the justification for the punishment than
when judges use predictions to distribute punishment in other-
wise accepted ranges. Whenever the state tries to justify excep-
tional actions that could not be taken without a prediction, the
prediction carries the entire weight of the state action. This
fact places a tremendous burden on the levels of certainty and
proof necessary to support the validity of the prediction.
The Supreme Court accepted the exceptional uses of pre-
dictions in Barefoot and Jones, but that should not justify an-
other exceptional use for preventive detention. The state had
convicted the defendant in Barefoot of murder 264 and the de-
fendant in Jones had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.265
Whenever judges use predictions to modify sentences, the pre-
dictions affect the detention or punishment of the individual
only after the state at least has established the grounds for
punishment - that is, obtained a conviction.
A corollary to the distinction between customary and ex-
traordinary use of predictions is that given a separate justifica-
tion for pretrial detention (not preventive detention), the state
might use scientific predictions to distribute detention among
the class of suspects detained under that justification. Thus, for
example, if the state could detain all suspects accused and
charged with murder under accepted principles - because such
defendants are most likely to flee or to interfere with the trial
process - then the state could use predictions of dangerousness
to determine which suspects to release pending trial, which to
release on other terms. (for example, bail or special conditions
of release), and which not to release at all. Although such uses
of predictions for pretrial detention determinations would raise
the difficult practical and evidentiary problems discussed in
263. See supra notes 250-65 and accompanying text.
264. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 883.
265. Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
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this Article, they would not raise the deeper problem of trump-
ing basic liberty interests. Any misapplication would be in
favor of liberty; any error would be within a loss of liberty
otherwise allowed.
3. Practical Problems With Predictions
The practical and evidentiary barriers to the use of predic-
tions of dangerousness as a basis for detention are substantial.
Even the best controlled prospective prediction studies26 have
success rates that raise serious questions about Congress's con-
clusions regarding the ability to predict dangerousness. And
despite the limited success of controlled studies, the reality of
discretionary judicial predictions based on expert testimony is
far worse still. 267
As noted by the Supreme Court,268 no'study has predicted
future violent behavior for any group of individuals over a rea-
sonable length of time at greater than one positive or accurate
prediction for every two negative or inaccurate predictions.269
Professor Alschuler argues that these predictive studies under-
state criminologists' and psychologists' ability to predict vio-
lence.2 70  Among other points, he notes that the rate of
recidivism (measured by rearrest) is higher for some groups
than the level of violence claimed by these studies.271 This ob-
servation confuses the level of subsequent criminal acts with vi-
olence. Indeed, most of Alschuler's points do not apply to
predictions of violence in the pretrial context because he
changes one or two of the critical variables in prediction: either
266. A prospective study is one which tests a hypothesis on data collected
in the future rather than using past data to define or test a model. See Gottf-
redson, supra note 234, at 24-38.
267. See generally Toborg & Bellassai Attempts to Predict Pretrial Vio-
lence: Research Findings and Legislative Responses, In CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
supra note 245, at 116-17 (summarizing research studies on the prediction of
pretrial violence); Jackson, The Impact of Pretrial Preventive Detention, 12
JUST. SYS. J. 305 (1987) (examining pretrial detention policies in various juris-
dictions and concluding that most policies have minimal effects on pretrial
crime).
268. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 900 n.7 (1983) (citing J. MONAHAN,
THnE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)).
269. Predictions of a future event which come true are known as "true pos-
itive" predictions. Affirmative predictions that do not come true are known as
"false positives." Predictions that an event will not occur which are correct
are called "true negatives," while predictions of nonoccurrence that do in the
end occur are called "false negatives." See Tonry, supra note 241, at 393-97.
270. Alschuler, supra note 31, at 539-48.
271. Id. at 544-48.
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the time period of the prediction or the seriousness of the pre-
dicted act.- 2 Additionally, Alschuler does not address the
question of whether any expert can predict who among a large
group will actually commit the acts.
However moderate the success of predictions in controlled
settings,7 3 they prove far less accurate in actual pretrial set-
tings. Since the District of Columbia detention provisions took
effect in 1970, researchers have conducted only a handful of
studies to determine the accuracy of predictions in practice.- 4
Low overall rates of pretrial crime (even measured by rearrest)
present a difficult challenge in predicting who these offenders
will be.275 Compared to the one in three predictive level for vi-
olent behavior attained by the most accurate controlled predic-
tive studies, efforts to predict pretrial crime in actual practice
have essentially failed.2 6 Conducting a proper blind test of an
operative pretrial detention system is difficult politically be-
cause it would involve releasing some individuals who would
otherwise be detained. Few communities or politicians would
accept scientific experimentation involving the release of "dan-
gerous" individuals (despite the fact that authorities would re-
lease them without the "dangerous" label). Because the state
detains those predicted to commit serious crimes, studies can-
not determine what their actual behavior would have been
272. Id
273. The difficulty of obtaining even moderately successful predictions sug-
gests another overwhelming practical problem: the cost of producing scientific
predictions - especially given the short time frame for such decisions -
might overwhelm the criminal justice system. In other words, even if experts
could better predict future dangerousness, it might simply not be worth it.
274. See Fagan & Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial Pre-
diction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment (predictions of
juvenile criminality) (unpublished study, relevant excerpts on file with the
Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter Fagan & Guggenheim study]; Toborg &
Bellassai, supra note 267, at 103-07 (reviewing recent research on predictions
of pretrial criminality); Jackson, supra note 267, at 307-08.
275. The question of the amount of pretrial crime is distinct from the ques-
tion of how well judges or experts can predict who will commit pretrial crime.
In theory (though not in fact) overall levels of pretrial crime can be very low,
yet experts can identify precisely who will commit that crime. Similarly, pre-
trial crime can be at moderate levels, yet experts can be unable to predict who
among a class of defendants will commit that crime. See Fagan & Guggenheim
study, supra note 274.
276. Toborg & Bellassai, supra note 267, at 116 ("At present, predictions of
future criminality cannot be made with a high degree of reliability for individ-
ual defendants. Nevertheless, groups of defendants much more likely to com-
mit crime-on-bail than other groups of defendants can be relatively accurately
identified.").
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upon release. In light of this dilemma, the best analytical tool
available to test the validity of the detention is measurement of
the rates of crime by those actually released and by those for
whom prosecutors requested but the court denied detention.
One important exception to this dilemma is a recent study
in which the researchers tested the accuracy of predictions of
dangerousness of accused juvenile delinquents.27 A federal
district court issued a continuing writ of habeas corpus for all
juveniles preventively detained in New York City.278 During
the three years in which the writ was effective, New York
Family Court judges identified over seventy accused delin-
quents who would ordinarily be jailed pending trial because
they posed a high risk of committing a crime if released.279
Due to the district court order, the state did not actually detain
any of these juveniles280
The study indicated that the great majority of juveniles did
not require detention to prevent crime before trial and that,
had they been detained, most would have needlessly lost their
liberty.281 The study analyzed the rearrest rates of juveniles by
dividing their offenses into two categories: violent, felony of-
fenses,282 and any crime, regardless of its seriousness. 283 In ad-
dition, several time periods were used to determine when the
juveniles were rearrested.28 Under the New York scheme, all
delinquency trials, even for those not detained, were to be com-
pleted within 90 days after arrest.2 5 Thus, the study focused
on rearrest rates within 90 days.
Of the juveniles predicted to commit a crime, 18.7% were
277. Fagan & Guggenheim study, supm note 274.
278. The district court issued the order in United States ex reL Martin v.
Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), after it declared the statutory
provision authorizing preventive detention unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court eventually vacated and overturned the order in Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 281 (1984).
279. Since enactment of the New York Family Court Act in 1962, judges
could detain accused delinquents upon arrest whenever the judge found there
was a "serious risk" that the juvenile, if released, would commit a crime before
the next court date. N.Y. FAm. Cr. AcT. § 320.5 (McKinmey 1983).
280. Fagan & Guggenheim study, s-upr note 274.
281. Id.
282. Violent felony offenses were defined as all charges of assault, robbery,
sex-related crimes, kidnapping, homicide, and manslaughter for which the
maximum penalty is imprisonment for greater than one year. I&
283. Id-
284. I&
285. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 340.1 (McKinney 1983).
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rearrested for a violent felony crime within 90 days.286 Thus,
eight out of ten juveniles who would have been detained would
not have been rearrested for a violent offense within the total
time of their pretrial confinement. Of the juveniles predicted
to commit a crime, 40.5% were rearrested for any crime within
90 days.2s 7 Thus even for this very broad category, nearly six
out of ten juveniles would have been detained for false
reasons.
288
The high level of false positives demonstrates that the abil-
ity to predict future crimes - and especially violent crimes -
is so poor that such predictions will be wrong in the vast major-
ity of cases. Therefore, judges should not use them as an in-
dependent justification for major deprivations of liberty such as
detention.
The study raises another important point. It found that
fifty-seven percent of the juveniles ordered to be detained on
dangerousness grounds were never convicted of any of the
charges brought against them.289 In these cases the juveniles
were both falsely accused and preventively detained to prevent
them from committing future crimes.
The use of predictions of dangerousness in the current law
286. Fagan & Guggenheim study, supra note 274.
287. Two points must be kept in mind about studies of rearrest. First,
arrest does not equal conviction. Second, arrest for crimes that do not pose a
threat to personal safety should not be used to justify detention.
288. Finally, more than two years after a judge found the juveniles to be so
dangerous that they required detention, 27.5% were never rearrested for a vio-
lent offense and 17.5% were never rearrested for any crime. In other words,
had the judges confined all of the juveniles for two years (eight times longer
than the maximum time within which their case had to be tried), more than 27
out of 100 would not have been rearrested for a violent offense and more than
17 would never have been rearrested at all. Fagan & Guggenheim study,
supra note 274.
289. The study found that of those ordered to be detained 42.9% were con-
victed of some crime (though many were convicted of less serious crimes than
charged), 40.5% of the cases were withdrawn or dismissed outright, and an ad-
ditional 16.6% of the cases were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal and
dismissed after six months. Fagan & Guggenheim study, supra note 274. Of
course, it is impossible to know what the outcomes of the cases would have
been had the juveniles actually been jailed as the judges wanted. But it is un-
likely that the outcomes would have been similar. Rather, as studies have con-
sistently shown, when the accused is detained before trial, the strong
probability is that the case will result in conviction. See, e.g., Ares, Rankin &
Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project" An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial
Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 84-86 (1963); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial De-
tention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 642 (1964). We know of no other study in
which case outcomes of detainees were examined where the conviction rate
was under 50%.
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of federal pretrial detention goes far beyond any careful or lim-
ited application of current predictive abilities. Under the proce-
dures and standards enacted by Congress and upheld by the
Supreme Court, the use of predictions is little different than if
Congress had directed the federal courts to rely on a fortune
teller's predictions. If the court closely questioned the fortune
teller and the fortune teller asserted great confidence in his or
her conclusions, the court would be encouraged to rely on the
conclusion in deciding to jail the defendant.
Independent of whether experts can predict who will com-
mit crimes before trial, this Article must still address two ques-
tions, one of theory and another of practice. The theoretical
question is whether the threat of crime should ever be the basis
for detention. Predictions of dangerousness might be a more
plausible basis for detention if they were very reliable. If one
could identify those very likely to commit a pretrial, violent
criminal act, even powerful theoretical arguments against reli-
ance on predictions would wilt in the face of the substantial
threat such defendants would pose. This rationale extends,
however, beyond the period between arrest and trial. Deten-
tion on the basis of ironclad predictions of dangerousness would
be justifiable even without arrest or criminal charge. The de-
tention would take on the character of civil detention - done
not to punish, but to protect both the individual and society.
Accordingly, the defendant should be entitled to the separate
substantive and procedural standards and separate incarcera-
tive settings involved in involuntary civil commitment. Thus,
even the extreme case of ultrareliable predictions does not
change our view about detention based upon the charge and
before trial unless society is willing to extend this rationale to
authorize detention before any charge.
A key rhetorical turning point in the debate over preven-
tive detention is just how much pretrial crime happens. An im-
portant distinction exists between studies of the accuracy of
predictions of short-term criminality or violence and studies
measuring the amount of crime that those released before trial
actually commit. Much of the debate over detention based on
additional crimes before trial has centered on the evidence
about the frequency of such crimes.2 ° This debate occurs be-
cause a high level of pretrial crime might justify detention even
without an ability to predict which particular defendants will
commit the crimes. This Article deals with this separate issue
290. See infra Part H. A. 3.
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in Part II,21 where it evaluates whether current detention
standards are adequate to deal with crime before trial. If soci-
ety is comfortable with pretrial detention based on threat of
crime, it must consider whether the current level of predictive
accuracy is sufficient to detain. For example, assume that those
released before trial will commit some substantial level of vio-
lent crime - say ten percent. The question remains whether
decisionmakers can identify that group from among the total
population of accused individuals - in social science terms, a
question of the number of true and false positives.292
If the United States criminal justice system still rejects im-
mediate punishment because of the possibility that an individ-
ual may be innocent - if it operates under the maxim that
failing to convict nine guilty persons is preferable to punishing
one who is innocent - then it cannot abide a system that justi-
fies detention based on a finding that is never more accurate
that one in three and is almost always much less accurate than
that.2 3 Because predictions of dangerousness - even in the
careful, scientific world that does not exist at detention hear-
ings within hours of arrest - will be wrong most of the time,29
they should never provide an independent justification for de-
priving an individual of liberty.-95
II. SHIFTING THE BURDEN: THE PROCEDURES
GOVERNING DETENTION
The recurring nature of the debate over pretrial detention
suggests the need for a framework to compare policies in differ-
ent eras and across jurisdictions. The use of predictions -
highlighting the absence of a concept of punishment - is only
the current turning point in the ongoing debate over detention.
If one central idea can define a system of detention, it
would be the relative burdens placed on the government and on
291. Id.
292. See supra note 269.
293. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). In Barefoot, the Supreme
Court accepted the proposition that "the 'best' clinical research currently in
existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more
that one out of three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period
among institutionalized populations that had both committed violence in the
past . . . and who were diagnosed as mentally ill." Id at 900 (citing J.
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981)).
294. Id.
295. Short-term predictions of severe harm, such as predictions justifying
short-term civil commitment or detention after a suicide attempt, provide
closely circumscribed exceptions.
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the individual before and during detention. "Burden" is used to
mean the sum of procedural and other "costs" that both the in-
dividual and the government incur as the government seeks,
obtains, and maintains pretrial detention. Within this broader
notion - which we refer to as the "burden of detention" - fits
the important and more familiar evidentiary burden of proof
applied to particular facts at a detention hearing.2
At one end of a spectrum of relative burdens would be sys-
tems that give the government enormous power to detain indi-
viduals on a wide array of grounds or even without public
justification, for long periods of time and without procedural
protection or review. Indeed, this may sound like some totali-
tarian regimes around the world.2 At the other end of the
spectrum would be governments forbidden to detain without a
criminal conviction, reinforced by a criminal process replete
with substantive and procedural protections.
The following four elements go far towards distinguishing
various detention systems:
(1) the grounds which justify detention;
(2) the procedures required for detention, including time limits and
mandatory review;
(3) independent values, such as a speedy trial and the right to coun-
sel, that limit the impact of detention;
(4) alternatives to detention used to achieve the same ends.
This list does not suggest a necessary "right" answer for all sys-
tems. These elements are choices or tradeoffs. 298 They are
meant primarily to clarify the underlying concerns in the de-
bate over detention. Applying these principles to current
United States practices reveals, however, that lawmakers are
making choices that seem to violate independent principles and
norms of the United States' own legal culture.
A. GROUNDS FOR DETENTION
The grounds that justify detention set the tone for each
296. See infra notes 384-93 and accompanying text.
297. The release of people held in detention and changes in detention rules
may be among the first signs of political change in some repressive regimes.
Conversely, increased detention, like that reported in China after Tienamin
Square, China Annouces Release of 573 Detainees, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1990, at
A13, col. 3 (10,000 detained at time of protest), suggests rejection of principles
of open and democratic government.
298. Judge Stephen Breyer's superb article explaining the kind of com-
promises made in establishing a federal sentencing guidelines system serves as
a model for this approach. See Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
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system. Grounds for detention may include those familiar (if
not fully established) in American law, such as appearance at
trial, protection of witnesses, and prevention of pretrial
crime.29 The possible grounds for detention extend well be-
yond those traditionally recognized in the United States. Other
countries currently use detention for social control: to quash
debate and to punish without trial.3°° In the most extreme in-
stances, the decision to detain serves as a determination of
guilt.
Detention to prevent pretrial crime assumes not only that
a criminal trial system exists, but also that time elapses be-
tween arrest and trial. Thus, selection of purposes for deten-
tion reflects the structure and purpose of the entire criminal
justice system. It reflects also the substantive definition of par-
ticular crimes. Where independent requirements of a free and
willing act or protection of speech do not limit the definition of
crimes, the government can easily use detention for political
control rather than crime control.
If countries such as South Africa, Chile, or Cuba offered
"dangerousness" or "threat of breaking the criminal laws
before trial" as factors for detention, citizens in the United
States would likely doubt both the honesty of the justification
and the ability of the government to determine such a factor.301
American citizens would assume that the government was
merely creating a smokescreen for political or class oppression.
They would "know" how difficult (perhaps impossible) it is to
determine who is likely to break a law in the future especially
when the laws in question restrict acts that Americans consider
deserving of protection, like political speech.
To suggest that the practice of detention in each country
reflects its history, culture, and government is not to suggest
that unbridled use of detention in other countries is legiti-
mate.302 This discussion simply notes that many countries al-
299. See supra notes 158-75 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 297.
301. Such a claim by a country with untrustworthy government motives
sounds much like the Soviet use of psychiatric facilities and "civil" commit-
ment to control dissidents, at least in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union.
302. A number of notable international human rights documents address
detention. They may have substantial implications for law in the United
States. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 9-10,
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 371-72 (1967) [hereinafter International Covenant],
and the European and American Convention on Human Rights each contain
specific provisions on how long governments may detain individuals before
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low detention for reasons and for periods that would be
considered unacceptable in this countrysos Thus, in developing
a system of detention in the United States, lawmakers must
build upon our own legal and historical framework.
3°4
trial. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. T. S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/ser. L/V/HI.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673, 677-
78 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]; European Convention on
Human Rights, done Nov. 4, 1950, art. 5, Europ. T. S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention]. Many of these international materials are
increasingly emphasizing the importance of a public criminal trial.
303. For example, Israel has imposed detention policies in the West Bank
and Gaza (the "occupied territories") that allow summary detention for ex-
tended periods without formal charges and without a right to trial. See, e.g.,
Israel Imprisons Three Palestinian Leader without Trial, Wash. Post, Nov. 14,
1990, at A25, col. 1; Rights Group Says the Israelis Detained 5,000, N.Y. Times,
June 1, 1989, at All, col. 1.
304. This Article does not address in detail moral and legal arguments that
detention generally, or detention on the basis of future threat, violates basic
principles of humanity transcending particular political systems and particular
times. Such arguments appear commonly, however, in the international
human rights materials. Every international human rights agreement since
World War II states that individuals have a right to be free of arbitrary deten-
tion or imprisonment. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNIrED STATES § 702, reporters' note 6 (1986); see also Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, arts. 3, 9, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR (pt. 1) at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948). Article 3 states "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty,
and the security of the person," and Article 9 states, "[n]o one shall be subject
to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." International Covenant, supra note
302, at art. 9, para. 1. ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention."); Ameri-
can Convention, supra note 302, at art. 7, para. 1, 3. Paragraph one states
"[e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security." Paragraph
three states, "[n]o one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment."
See also European Convention, supra note 302, at art. 5, para 1 ("Everyone has
the right to libery and security of person"); African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, art. 6, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982). Legal scholars also have broadly recognized the unac-
ceptability of arbitrary detention. See, e.g., L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL
LAW 687-89 (1955); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HuMAN RiGHTS 82-83 (1973); L. HENKN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 89-101
(1978).
Detention is arbitrary under customary international law if "it is not pur-
suant to law or if it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the
dignity of the human person." RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw
OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, comment h (1986) (quoting Statement of U.S.
Delegation, 13 U.N. GAOR C.3 (863d mtg.) at 137, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.863
(1958)). In other words, "[d]etention is arbitrary if it is unlawful or unjust."
Id § 702, reporters' note 6.
The United States has recently reaffirmed the idea that the principles of
the U.N. Charter embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
constitute basic principles of international law and that there is "a correspond-
ing duty on the part of every state to respect and observe them." Memorial of
the United States (United States. v. Iran), 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings (United States
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1. Traditional Grounds for Detention in the United States
The government has used pretrial detention to protect the
orderly process of determining guilt or innocence.305 Society
widely accepts detention based on a careful determination that
the defendant is likely to flee or otherwise not appear for
trial.306 Charges of homicide or other extremely severe of-
fenses may raise a presumption that the accused will not ap-
pear for trial.30 7 In addition, detention may be justified if the
state can show that the defendant will threaten or harm wit-
nesses or will otherwise interfere with the collection of
evidence.308
Not surprisingly, the same lower federal courts that have
questioned detention on the basis of dangerousness have upheld
the federal provisions permitting pretrial detention on these
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran) 182 (May 24, 1980); see also Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the universal re-
nunciation of torture). The Supreme Court long ago recognized that
customary international law is sometimes applicable in courts of the United
States. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). At least one federal
court has relied upon customary international law in finding a right to be free
from arbitrary detention. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 797 (D.
Kan. 1980), aff'd, Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981).
This Article has argued that detention practice in this country is unprinci-
pled, that it ignores fundamental principles of the United States legal system,
and that reliance on predictions of criminality in particular cannot be justified
at present levels of knowledge, if ever. The perspective of the international
human rights material may allow a more dispassionate critique of United
States detention practice than is possible within the current political climate
regarding criminal justice issues. If nothing else, the international materials
drive home the point that U.S. citizens would consider detention accepted in
the United States to be unprincipled and unjust in other countries.
305. These traditional grounds for detention are, of course, retained under
the Bail Reform Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) & (B) (1988).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867, 869-70 (1st Cir.
1988); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Gotay, 609 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Mel-
ville, 309 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 5.1 (1968).
307. Detention without bail is dramatically higher in practice for murder
than for other crimes and generally higher for violent crimes than for non-vio-
lent crimes. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 524. On the capital offense
exception to bail, see Thaler, supra note 33, at 444-46. On refusal of bail based
on severity of crime, see, e.g., Stinnett v. United States, 387 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); United States v. Soto Rivera, 581 F. Supp. 561, 564 (D.P.R. 1984);
United States v. Meinster, 481 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
308. See, e.g., United States v. Catala Fronfrias, 612 F. Supp. 999, 1000-01
(D.P.R. 1985); United States v. Halloran, 327 F. Supp. 337, 339-41 (C.D. Cal.
1971).
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more traditional grounds.-19 Federal courts have repeatedly
upheld detention on the grounds that the defendant is likely to
obstruct justice by, for example, threatening or harming wit-
nesses.310 Of course, this justification can hide less accepted
purposes. The justification of threat should be restricted,
therefore, by standards of particularity and proof.311
Under the definition of constitutional punishment sug-
gested in Part 1,312 detention based on the traditional grounds is
not punishment because a clear, substantial, nonpunitive pur-
pose - protecting the orderly process of law - justifies it. A
number of important elements are included in the traditional
justification for detention: First, the grounds for detention con-
cern the protection of the legal process; second, these instances
are limited exceptions to the presumption in favor of pretrial
liberty; and third, the bail system provides a range of options
other than a simple two-choice decision to detain or not to de-
tain. To the extent that judges have used bail to detain individ-
uals and prevent crimes before trial rather than to ensure
appearance at trial, the bail system has served as a substitute
for a system of pretrial detention. 13
309. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 995-1004 (2d Cir.
1986).
310. See, eg., United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1986). Fed-
eral courts have found an inherent power in trial courts to deny bail to achieve
the orderly administration of justice. United States v. Provenzano, 578 F.
Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. La. 1983), qff'd, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1280-81 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 433 U.S. 907
(1977).
311. Courts have held that the standard of proof for risk of flight is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence and the standard for danger to the community is
clear and convincing evidence. United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406-
07 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Payne, 660 F. Supp. 288, 291-92 (E.D. Mo.
1987). Regardless of the standard of proof, the trial court must carefully assess
a claim that detention is necessary to protect the safety of witnesses. United
States v. Gallo, 653 F. Supp. 320, 332-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). In Gallo the court as-
sumed that a threat to witnesses had been made and then discounted the dan-
ger because it found "several prominent circumstances which make it in the
defendants' best interests to ensure the witness' presence at trial." Id. at 332.
The court noted that the witness had already testified before the grand jury,
which indicted the defendants, and at a previous bail hearing. The court had
informed the defendants that "if [the witness] is unavailable for trial and it
can reasonably be concluded that his absence resulted from the activities of
the defendants or their associates," the court will admit the prior statements
at trial. Id
312. See supra text accompanying notes 208-11.
313. Acknowledging that judges sometimes set bail at improper levels for
purposes of community protection does not justify detention without bail. The
eighth amendment expressly demands that in cases in which bail is set, it must
be set at a reasonable level. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Thus, the framers ad-
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One can reasonably fear the detention of accused but un-
tried individuals. This fear is similar (perhaps identical) to the
framers' fear that improper detention and bail practice could
lead to abusive government infringement of the liberties of its
citizens.314 One can easily envision police and prosecutors in an
overburdened urban setting who might find ready use for a
broader detention power, even (if not especially) in cases in
which they had no intention or expectation of eventual
conviction.
2. Concern About Crimes Before Trial
The concern that defendants will commit crimes before
trial is at the heart of the trend towards increased pretrial de-
tention. In a world of long delays before trial3 15 and case reso-
lution by bargaining rather than trial,316 the concern that
defendants may commit additional criminal acts before trial is
certainly legitimate. Society is rightly concerned about those
who have a record of several recent convictions for serious
charges.
Without any expansion of the traditional grounds for de-
tention, however, the legal system already has the tools to re-
spond to the majority of those who pose the greatest threat.
Offenders charged with a serious offense while serving a term
of probation or parole are detainable pending the determination
of the validity of the later charge.3 17 This detention - punish-
ment under the definition suggested in Part 11318 - is based
upon the prior determination of guilt. The state may lawfully
detain the individual without reliance on predictions of future
behavior by commencing parole or probation revocation pro-
ceedings upon a showing of something close to probable
cause.3 19 Ample authority exists for detention based on rear-
rest pending final determination that the parolee or proba-
tioner violated a condition of liberty by committing another
dressed the fear that bail would be used for improper purposes or set so high
as to achieve improper ends. Id.
314. Comment, supra note 39, at 198-200.
315. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 518.
316. Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading
Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1009-10 (1986).
317. See AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
RELEASE §§ 5.5-5.9 (1968).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
319. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(1); Note, Due Process and Probation Revo-
cation: The Written Statement Requirement, 56 FoRDHAM L. REv. 759, 760
(1988).
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crime.32 0
Ample authority also exists for detention of defendants
charged with extremely violent crimes.321 Practice firmly
anchored in history permits detention for crimes of extreme vi-
olence - in particular murder - even for a first offense.
322
Congress enacted the 1984 Bail Reform Act provisions
without considering the alternatives to preventive detention.
32s
Before enacting sweeping legislation radically altering basic
principles in the criminal justice system, Congress should have
at least explored the currently available alternative methods of
protecting society from repeated criminality. The underutiliza-
tion of parole and probation revocation 3m suggests that the sup-
port for expansive preventive detention was born more of
political considerations than actual need. Whether or not Con-
gress identified accurately the threat of pretrial crime, the
threat to the community from crimes of prior offenders can be
substantially met within current principles and procedures.
Current principles fail to encompass only one class of crim-
inal defendants: those suspects rearrested before trial whom a
judge had previously released on recognizance, bail, or release
conditions pending trial. Not all such suspects threaten the
community. The crime for which police have rearrested the de-
fendant must be serious - involving violence or the threat of
violence - in order to constitute a government interest suffi-
cient to challenge the presumption of liberty before trial.3a
The fear of crime moves from a rational but abstract plane
320. United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 837 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
Mollica v. United States, 465 U.S. 1078 (1984).
321. See, eg., United States v. Gatto, 750 F. Supp. 664, 672-76 (D.N.J. 1990).
Some sub-rosa detention to prevent crime may overstate the degree to which
crime prevention is a concern independent of the trial process concerns.
Those charged with more serious crimes might present a greater threat to the
community's safety. Yet those charged with more serious crimes are also
those most likely to be detained on the ground that they will flee because, fac-
ing severe punishment, they have the most to lose by appearing for trial and
risking conviction. The detention of those accused of murder can be explained
much more easily by a presumption that they will flee than by a fear that they
might commit further murders - a relatively rare and extreme act.
322. Comment, supra note 39, at 193, 200. The presumption of flight
should, of course, be rebuttable.
323. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3182.
324. Note, Limiting, supra note 45, at 330-51.
325. Project: Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1982-1983. I1 Preliminary Pro-
ceedings, 72 GEO. L.J. 365, 426 (1983).
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to a functional and concrete point whenever a defendant, re-
leased pending trial for a violent felony, is rearrested for a sub-
sequent serious act before the trial is completed. This limited
category poses a substantial challenge. Two choices are avail-
able. The first is to prohibit detention of these individuals sim-
ply because authorities have not yet convicted them. The
second is to permit detention - subject to certain procedural
safeguards - on the theory that they have violated a condition
of their release pending trial on the prior arrest. If this second
approach is taken, the safeguards should include a high stan-
dard of proof of guilt on the new charge.326 In addition, the
court should notify the defendant of the proposed detention
hearing, thus providing time to respond and the opportunity to
call witnesses as well as the opportunity to cross-examine the
government's witnesses. The higher burden of proof and the
requirement that the subsequent charge pose a real threat of
violence would protect the defendant against unwarranted
charges.
The power to detain in these circumstances is directly re-
lated to the state's ability to try the defendant on the original
charge. The defendant's failure to avoid arrest for a second se-
rious charge during the period in which the government is col-
lecting evidence to prove the original act arguably justifies
detention because the defendant failed to act in accordance
with the condition of good behavior during release.327 If the
326. For example, Arizona's constitutional bail provision reads:
All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for:
1. Capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great.
2. Felony offenses, committed when the person charged is al-
ready admitted to bail on a separate felony charge and where the
proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charge.
3. Felony offenses if the person charged poses a substantial dan-
ger to any other person or the community, if no conditions of release
which may be imposed will reasonably assure the safety of the other
person or the community and if the proof is evident or the presump-
tion great as to the present charge.
ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 22.
327. Separate justifications exist for short-term detention, both within and
outside of the criminal process. Within the criminal process, temporary deten-
tion is associated with arrest based upon probable cause. Outside the criminal
system, detention powers are associated with a system of short-term involun-
tary civil commitment, detention after a suicide attempt, or brief detention of
a minor based on the request of family members. This Article does not ad-
dress these short-term detention scenarios and justifications.
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state dismisses the prior pending case, however, the state
should release the accused in the remaining case.
Much of the public debate over pretrial detention has
turned on claims about the amount of crime committed before
trial by those already accused of crime. This debate does not
focus on the theory or grounds for detention, on past practice,
or on the operation of the criminal justice system. Instead, it is
a battle to shape public perception of the degree of threat posed
by pretrial crime. The level of pretrial crime asserted varies
within a huge range depending on the speaker's viewpoint. The
following section explores how people can possibly make the
vast array of claims about pretrial crime rates and considers
whether one can draw a more consistent, sensible picture of the
actual extent of pretrial crime.
3. Determining the Amount of Crime Before Trial
A recent National Institute of Justice film states that ac-
cused defendants on pretrial release commit one fifth of all
crimes.3 28 Both former Chief Justice Burgera2 and President
Reagan 330 told the American Bar Association that released sus-
pects commit vastly too much crime before trial. In enacting
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress emphasized the
need to "address the alarming problem of crimes committed by
persons on release."33' The key Senate report on the Bail Re-
form Act cites a study showing that "one out of every six de-
fendants in the sample studied were rearrested during the
pretrial period. '332 In another cited study in the District of Co-
lumbia, "thirteen percent of all felony defendants released
328. Out On Bail (National Institue of Justice Film 1986). In the film Out
On Bail, program commentators and experts show how to manipulate statis-
tics about crime on release. Some talked of "crime on release" without ex-
plaining the source of the figure; others talked of "rearrests." Professor James
Q. Wilson stated that one in six released defendants "commit crimes on bail,"
of which one in five are arrested. See M. SORIN, OUT ON BAIL STUDY GUIDE
(1986). No one tried to make sense of all the numbers tossed around. Earlier
studies had shown even higher levels of pretrial crime - up to 35% of re-
leased defendants. See P. WICE, supra note 202, at 74.
329. Address of Chief Justice Burger to the American Bar Association,
Feb. 8, 1981, cited in S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWS 3182, 3187.
330. Address of President Reagan to the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, September 28, 1981, cited in S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3182, 3187.
331. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmN. NEws 3182, 3185.
332. Id.
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were rearrested,"'' a and police rearrested those posing the most
serious bail risks at "the alarming rate of twenty-five per-
cent."33 Given such studies, there is little wonder at the wide
call for increased pretrial detention.
Other studies, including a recent study of rearrests of those
released under the Bail Reform Act, show that defendants re-
leased before trial commit crime at rates ranging from a frac-
tion of one percent to a few percentage points.a3- Given this
second set of studies, there is much wonder that detention is al-
lowed at all.
These two claims - of a tide of criminality on the one
hand and of negligible criminality on the other - are both
common in the public debate over pretrial detention. Recon-
ciling both claims presents a substantial challenge.
One possibility is that one group of studies is simply wrong
- based either on methodological error or fraud - and the
other right.s36 Another possibility is that the studies use differ-
ent definitions of pretrial crime. A third possibility is that the
studies are actually fairly consistent, but politicians manipulate
the data or misinterpret it for political advantage.
To facilitate discussion of these possibilities, this Article fo-
cuses on just four studies: the two studies on pretrial crime
upon which Congress relied in the legislative history to the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, showing rearrest rates of 13% and 25% re-
spectively; 37 a study of detention decisions under the Bail Re-
333. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 3189.
334. I.
335. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRnmNAL BArL: How BAIL
REFORM iS WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT CouRTS 39-40 (1987) [hereinafter
GAO STUDY]; Jackson, supra note 267, at 312-15.
336. This Article does not explore the methodological framework of the
wide range of studies on pretrial crime, nonappearance, or the factors judges
actually consider in setting bail. See, e.g., Landes, The Bail System: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 79 (1973) (suggesting economic model in
examining actual bail decisions); Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence
on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1974); J. ROTH & P. WICE, PRE-
TRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN THE DisTRiCr OF COLUMBIA 111-4 to HI-16
(PROMIS Research Project Publication 16, Institute for Law and Social Re-
search, 1978) (discussing studies). Instead, it identifies the kinds of factors that
make the bottom line in various studies look so different. This Article focuses
more on the way studies are used - the rhetoric of pretrial crime - than on
the methodology or accuracy of any particular study or on the conclusions
about what judges actually do consider in setting bail.
337. M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF PRAC-
TICES AND OuTCOMES 3 (1981); J. ROTH & P. WICE, supra note 336, at I1-45 to
II-51.
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form Act of 1984, suggesting rearrest rates of less than 1%;am
and a pre-Act study of rearrest in the federal district courts,
suggesting a rearrest rate of around 3 %.33 9
First, the rate of crime before trial (or of its surrogate in
these studies, rearrest) depends to a large extent on how
quickly the trial occurs after the defendant is released. If trials
on serious charges took place within two weeks, the rate of re-
arrest would be extremely low; on the other hand, if the state
never tried those charged, the rearrest rate would be similar to
the "recidivism" rate.m4
The period from arrest to trial is not, however, what most
clearly distinguishes the studies of pretrial crime. The clearest
distinction in aggregate terms is whether researchers conducted
the study in the federal courts or in state and local courts.
Studies in federal courts show rearrest rates for federal felony
defendants ranging from less than 2%m up to 4.7%.3 2 Two
studies serve as examples: the 1984 Sherwood-Fabre study
(which found a rearrest rate of around 3%)43 and the 1987
General Accounting Office study comparing pretrial crime
before and after the Bail Reform Act of 1984. s "
Sherwood-Fabre examined the behavior of released federal
defendants in ten districts.345 Although the study refers to de-
fendants who "commit" a misdemeanor or felony, the study in
fact correlated release under various conditions only with rear-
rest.346 The study found that authorities rearrested between
1.7% and 3.2% (depending on the type of condition of release)
338. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 39-40.
339. L. SHERWOOD-FABRE, supra note 64, at 173-94. The studies used as ex-
amples in this Article, however, have become a central part of the current
literature and debate. They involve the same distinguishing factors as the
other, older studies.
340. Recidivism is an odd term that seems fairly simple and yet is in fact
quite complex. Because researchers typically measure rearrest as a substitute
for "pretrial crime," recidivism here means the rate of rearrest over a long pe-
riod of time, whether for the same crime or a different, more or less serious
crime. See infra notes 367-75 and accompanying text.
341. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 37-41.
342. See Hearings on Pretrial Detention Act of 1983 H. 3491 before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1983). The data are
from the Pretrial Services Data System of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
343. L. SHERWOOD-FABRE, supra note 64, at 174.
344. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 13. The study analyzed a sample of
cases involving criminal defendants charged with a felony. Id.
345. L. SHERWOOD-FABRE, supra note 64, at 78.
346. Id. at 410, 420.
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of defendants for misdemeanors and between 1.2% and 3.9% for
felonies.-47 In sum, the study found that less than 6% of the de-
fendants whom judges would have predicted to be dangerous
under the District of Columbia Act and the then-proposed Fed-
eral Bail Reform Act standards "ever committed any type of
bail violation."' 48
The level of pretrial crime that the Sherwood-Fabre study
suggested for a group of federal defendants is, of course, much
lower than the numbers Congress relied upon in the same year
in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984. Moreover, Sherwood-
Fabre did not evaluate whether the state was able to later con-
vict the rearrested defendants of the crime for which authori-
ties rearrested them. A post-Bail Reform Act study not only
confirms the suspicion that Congress was playing with the
numbers, but makes the point even more clearly and forcefully
than the Sherwood-Fabre study.
A General Accounting Office study in 1987 compared pre-
Bail Reform Act cases (of defendants released on bail in the
first six months of 1984) with early Bail Reform Act cases (of
defendants released on bail in the first six months of 1986). It
analyzed a random sample of several thousand federal defend-
ants released on bail in four federal judicial districts.349 This
study showed rearrest on a felony or misdemeanor at 1.8%
under pre-Bail Reform Act law and 0.8% under the Bail Re-
form Act.sm° The study emphasized that "[n]o comprehensive,
reliable statistics exist on the extent to which federal defend-
ants released on bail... are arrested for committing additional
crimes while on bail."' 5
The GAO felt the need to explain the discrepancy between
these statistics and those the Senate Judiciary Committee cited
in the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 that
suggested rates "of crime on bail as somewhere between 7 to 20
percent."' 's 2 The GAO noted that the studies upon which Con-
347. I at 309-21.
348. Id- at 446. The study found that the various factors used in the Dis-
trict of Columbia statute and the then-proposed federal statute could accu-
rately predict little if any of the pretrial crime. Thus, use of these predictions
would lead to an enormous number of "false positives." Id
349. The four districts were the Northern District of Indiana, the District
of Arizona, the Southern District of Florida and the Eastern District of New
York. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 12.
350. Id at 36.
351. Id-
352. Id (citing S. REP. No. 317, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 34 (1982); S. REP. No.
147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983)).
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gress relied upon "included defendants from local jurisdictions
as well as federal defendants from the District of Columbia."=
State and local rearrest rates, including those in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, tend to be higher than federal rearrest rates.
Congress relied upon one study in the District of Columbia
which showed a pretrial rearrest rate on serious charges of
seven percent.354 A study in Philadelphia - from about the
same time as the District of Columbia study - showed a pre-
trial rearrest rate on serious charges of about six percent of
those released after arraignment.
Analysis of the two studies Congress relied upon reveals
additional information. The Roth & Wice study examined a
group of defendants in the District of Columbia in 1974.3 The
study concluded that "[a]mong felony defendants on pretrial re-
lease during 1974, 13 percent were rearrested before disposition
of their cases; among alleged misdemeanants, the estimated
rate was 7 percent. 35 7 The study noted that felony defendants
released on cash bond were "by far the least dependable" and
that authorities rearrested twenty-five percent of them.aIi The
long, detailed Roth & Wice study does not distinguish the
crimes for which authorities rearrested the released defend-
ants. Thus, the rearrest figures seem to be for any felony or
misdemeanor.3 5 9
The study referred to in the Senate Report ° as the "Lazar
Institute" study evaluated bail statistics from a number of juris-
dictions, including Washington, D.C.361 The study showed ag-
gregate rearrest rates of sixteen percent, although the figures
353. Id
354. M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RISK AsSESSMENT IN THE DisTsicr OF COLUM-
BIA: THE EFFECTS OF CHANGED PROCEDURES 4 (1984) (prepared for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency).
355. Goldkamp, Questioning the Practice of Pretrial Detention: Some Em-
pirical Evidence from Philadelphia, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRuMNOLOGY 1556, 1567
(1983).
356. J. ROTH & P. WICE, supra note 336, at iv.
357. Id- at H-48 (footnotes omitted).
358. Id
359. The study appears to count any arrest in the pretrial period. Id.
360. The results of the study are more readily available in a National Insti-
tute of Justice publication than in the source cited in the legislative history.
See M. TOBORG, supra note 337, at 3.
361. The eight jurisdictions were Baltimore, Maryland; Baltimore County,
Maryland; Washington, D.C.; Dade County, Florida; Louisville, Kentucky;
Pima County, Arizona; Santa Cruz County, California; Santa Clara County,
California Id.
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varied considerably by jurisdiction.36 2 About half of all pretrial
arrests in the study led to a conviction.363 Although the study
noted the importance of assessing the type of charges on rear-
rest and suggested that the rearrest charges tended to be less
serious than the original charges, it did not provide detailed
data regarding rearrest charges.3 Congress mentions little of
the relevant detail - such as the fact that these were not fed-
eral defendants - in the legislative history of the Bail Reform
Act.
Rearrest rates for federal felony defendants probably are
lower because, to paraphrase Lester Maddox, they are a better
class of defendant.365 Unlike state offenses, which run the
gamut from trivial to the most severe and which include most
common street crimes, federal crimes generally require more
organization, money, and sophistication.3
Given the difference between federal and state rearrest
rates, Congress understandably - though not justifiably -
chose to refer only to studies of state and local jurisdictions in
justifying its increase in federal pretrial preventive detention.
The studies of federal felony defendants simply did not provide
a dramatic basis for shifting the burden of detention from the
government trying to detain and convict to the defendant.
The analysis of these studies reveals three common
problems with efforts to describe the extent of pretrial crime:
(1) the studies examine rearrests although the real issue is the
extent of pretrial crime; (2) the studies examine aggregate data
on rearrests rather than distinguishing subsequent crime by
original charge; and (3) the studies fail to examine the type of
alleged offenses for which authorities rearrest defendants.
The studies of pretrial "crime" in fact tend to study some-
362. Id. at 20-21. The rates varied from 7.5% in the city of Baltimore to
22.2% in Dade County, Florida. Id
363. Id The jurisdictions convicted 7.8% of released defendants of a crime
committed during the pretrial period. Id at 21.
364. Id. at 20-21, 70, 73-74.
365. Lester Maddox, the former governor of Georgia, suggested that to im-
prove the prison system "we need a better class of prisoners." A Better Class
of Prisoner, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1984, at A19, col. 1.
366. This distinction is probably less pronounced than it was ten years ago
due to the increasing use of federal prosecutorial and prison resources for
fairly minor drug possession and distribution crimes. Currently around 50% of
federal cases are drug cases compared to 23% in 1980. Compare UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMSSION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 39-40 (1990) with
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at 479.
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thing different: rearrest.3 7 The disadvantage of using arrest as
a marker for crime is that the police officer's decision to arrest
is far removed from any determination of guilt or innocence.
In the Roth & Wice study, for example, the courts subsequently
convicted only forty percent of those rearrested while on pre-
trial release of the crime for which police rearrested them. s
On the other hand, one may argue that "real" crime rates are
much higher than reflected by defendants whom police happen
to rearrest.369 The advantage of using the number of arrests is
that it is a relatively clear, easily determined measure. Rather
than either using some kind of multiplier of arrests to deter-
mine "real" crime or using convictions on the subsequent of-
fense as a measure of whether the defendant committed a
crime while on pretrial release, researchers and policymakers
have settled on arrest as the best alternative - avoiding the in-
terpretation either of the other approaches would require.
Most of the studies of rearrest before trial take as a base all
persons charged with a felony in the jurisdiction under
study. 70 Yet few systems allow detention for any felony,37 '
and felonies often include a wide range of behavior posing vary-
ing degrees of threat to individuals. Whether looking at all de-
fendants accused of a felony generates a higher or lower
aggregate rearrest rate is unclear. What is clear is that the
studies of pretrial "crime" have moved far from the concerns
that stimulate the increased use of detention.
The most substantial problem with studies of pretrial rear-
rests before trial is that they include in the rearrest statistics
crimes that do not reflect the policy reasons behind preventive
detentionY. 2 Some of the studies look only at felony rearrests
while others look at arrests for either a felony or misde-
367. Some studies acknowledge this distinction. See, e.g., M. TOBORG, supra
note 337, at 21 (distinguishing data on rearrest from data on convictions on
those arrests).
368. J. ROTH & P. WIcE, supra note 336, at vi, H-48 to H-51.
369. See, e.g., Serrano, The Thin Blue Line: Police Blame Explosion in
Cime Population for Drop in Service, L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, part HI, at 1,
col. 1, (San Diego Co. ed.).
370. See, e.g., Note, Limiting, supra note 45, at 337 n.94; Comment, supra
note 39, at 201.
371. Comment, A Loaded Weapon, supra note 44, at 172.
372. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 267, at 305; Note, Releasing Inmatesfrom
State and County Correctional Institutions: The Propriety of Federal Court
Release Orders, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 1165, 1181-82 (1986) (rearrest rates are not
an exact means of measuring danger to society but may be the best data
available).
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meanor373 - indeed this difference may explain some of the va-
riation in the studies - but most studies do not limit the
relevant category to rearrests on serious or violent felonies.
The 1981 Lazar Institute study Congress relied upon did
distinguish, to some extent, the types of charges for which po-
lice rearrested defendants.374 The study concluded that rear-
rest charges tend to be less serious.3 75
The GAO study of federal bail practice in selected federal
districts under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 made this point
more clearly. As noted previously, the study showed a pretrial
rearrest rate of 1.8% before the new law and 0.8% after.3 76
Among this small group of federal felony defendants rearrested
in the sample districts, most of the subsequent charges involved
lesser crimes than the original felony charges. A majority of
the rearrests (fifty-six percent) were for misdemeanors; the
most frequent charge was illegal operation of a motor vehicle
(such as driving with a suspended license or driving while
intoxicated). 77
Studies must take account of the seriousness of the offense
for which police rearrest a pretrial defendant in order to deter-
mine whether defendants pose a level of threat that justifies
detention. An overview of detention studies, including studies
of state and local detention, concluded that "serious pretrial
crime is relatively infrequent."378 The result, especially in the
federal system, suggests an extremely low level of serious pre-
trial crime.
Thus, the studies of pretrial crime, as a group, fail to justify
the policies underlying the call for pretrial detention. The time
has come to ask whether any study can identify a sufficiently
high rate of violent or threatening crime before trial for any
group - based either on the charged offense or, more likely, on
373. See, e.g., J. ROTH & P. WicE, supra note 336, at 11-48; GAO STUDY,
supra note 335, at 13.
374. M. TOBORG, supra note 337, at 21.
375. Id- at 22. Despite a reference to data in the appendix, the study did
not clearly analyze the charges on which authorities rearrested the defendants
before trial. Instead, the appendix presented the data by original charge (to
show the total number rearrested) and by the number convicted of the crime
for which authorities rearrested them. See id. at 69-74 (Appendix A).
376. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 39-40. Government researchers could
not even credit the new law with the insignificant, actual drop (one percent) in
rearrests. They did postulate however that the new law could have been a
contributing factor. Id
377. Id. at 40.
378. Jackson, supra note 267, at 332.
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a combination of the charged offense, past record, and other
characteristics. Until a study determines the level of serious
threat from pretrial crime, policymakers cannot have a bal-
anced discussion of whether a detention policy should exist for
any category of individuals or of the extent to which judicial
discretion should play a role in identifying those individuals.
Because the studies reveal that the base rates of rearrest
on serious charges are very low in the federal system, the justi-
fication for a high rate of detention is missing. These studies
suggest that detention, at least in the federal system, misses its
mark most of the time. An unacceptably high rate of false posi-
tives disserves both detainees and society. If the probability
that detention is preventing crime is extremely low, the deten-
tion is plainly nothing more than punishment for past behavior.
The pretrial studies, particularly the recent GAO study of
the federal courts, suggest that policymakers have vastly over-
stated the threat from pretrial detainees.379 They suggest also
that the policy response is one-dimensional, unimaginative, and
unnecessarily restrictive of individual liberty. If someone can
determine factors indicating higher levels of dangerousness or
criminality, proper conditions of release and other lesser intru-
sions on liberty may meet much of the concern. Such an ap-
proach is more consonant with the established system of justice
and with respect for the liberty interests of citizens.3 0
B. THE BURDEN OF DETENTION
The second key element for distinguishing detention sys-
tems concerns the procedures that guide the detention decision.
Inadequate procedures for determining whether the state has
proved the factual basis of grounds for detention can over-
whelm even carefully prescribed grounds for detention. On the
one hand, a system can enable a magistrate to make an ex parte
detention judgment that is not explained or subject to review.
On the other, a system can require a full hearing or trial on
whether the state has satisfied the grounds for detention. As
noted at the beginning of Part II of this Article, however, the
"burden of detention" encompasses notions of procedure far be-
379. One could argue that the state studies demonstrate a greater threat
from state defendants, and therefore, detention is justified in the states. The
studies of state pretrial crime, however, fail to bolster the case for detention.
Those studies still do not examine how soon defendants are rearrested, the
charges for which they are rearrested, and whether the arrest data are accept-
able measures of pretrial crime.
380. See suprm notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
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yond the evidentiary standards required to justify or attack the
detention decision.
Procedures related to the broad notion of "burden of de-
tention" can attach at various stages of the detention process.
Procedures related to detention include those governing police
investigation as well as the procedures for initial and subse-
quent detention hearings. Although procedures alone cannot
make an inappropriate determination appropriate, procedures
protect important substantive rights3s1 In the context of pre-
trial detention, procedures provide the tools to insure a sound
judgment.38 2
This Section has three short parts. Part 1 discusses the
specific procedural requirements of an initial detention hearing,
including the narrower issue of burdens of persuasion and
proof. It emphasizes the importance of the procedural differ-
ences between the District of Columbia Act and the Federal
Bail Reform Act of 1984. Part 2 considers some evidence of the
inability of current federal detention procedures to generate
consistent or principled decisions. Part 3 returns to the broader
notion of "burden of detention" and explores ways to generate
better detention decisions other than by manipulating the bur-
den of proof at initial detention hearings.
1. The Procedures Governing Detention Hearings
Both the District of Columbia Act and the Federal Bail Re-
form Act provide that an arrested defendant has a right to
counsel.3a3 Indeed, a scheme denying assistance of counsel at
the detention stage should not survive sixth amendment chal-
381. The protection of substantive rights in the real world turns on the ful-
crum of procedure. The early history of bail reform in England is essentially a
history of procedure, from the Statute of Westminster in 1275, listing bailable
offenses, to the 1688 Bill of Rights, prohibiting excessive bail. See D. FREED &
P. WALD, supra note 36, at 1.
382. In Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1164 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot sub
nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 480 (1982) (per curiam), the Eighth Circuit
struck down a detention scheme because it failed to provide procedures guar-
anteeing a reasonable determination of an individual's dangerous propensities.
The development of proper procedures could limit the ill effects of the current
federal law's unbounded judicial discretion.
383. The D.C. Act provides that for pretrial detention hearings, "the per-
son shall be entitled to representation by counsel and shall be entitled to pres-
ent information by proffer or otherwise to testify, and to present witnesses in
his own behalf." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(4) (1989). The Federal Bail Re-
form Act provides that at pretrial detention hearings the defendant 'has the
right to be represented by counsel, and if financially unable to obtain adequate
representation, to have counsel appointed." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
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lenge.-34 This illustrates the importance of the procedures re-
lated to detention determinations. Unless adequate standards
govern the detention decision itself, however, counsel's role
may be reduced to accompanying his or her client to jail.
This Article has previously noted the critical differences
between the detention procedure of the District of Columbia
Act and those of the Federal Bail Reform Act.A85 For example,
the District of Columbia Act requires that the government
prove that the accused is a threat to the community by clear
and convincing evidence386 Because of this burden of proof
and the other more specific requirements of the District of Co-
lumbia Act, prosecutors did not extensively use the Act's provi-
sions during the first fifteen years of its existence.38 7 Although
no case challenging the District of Columbia Act ever reached
the Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
relied heavily on these specific procedural protections, includ-
ing limitations on the period of detention, in upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Act.ass
The addition of similar procedures - requiring the govern-
ment to show a "substantial probability" that the defendant
committed the crime that it charges, limiting the list of charges
for which the government can seek detention, placing a limit
384. Although the Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975),
that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to counsel for a probable cause
hearing, the detention resulting from such a hearing is short-term and regula-
tory in nature. The Court has not yet decided whether a defendant has a right
to counsel at a hearing regarding preventive detention or bail. The sixth
amendment case law suggests, however, that such a hearing involves the "ad-
versarial process," and therefore, a defendant is entitled to counsel. See Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality); cf United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (sixth amendment right to a speedy trial begins when ac-
cused is arrested); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967) (counsel's
absence during line up in which defendant was identified violated sixth
amendment). Detention of an individual with a presumptive right to liberty is,
of course, distinguishable from even long-term administrative detention of an
incarcerated prisoner. See, eg., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192
(1984).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 82-90.
386. See supra note 81.
387. See N. BASES & W. McDONALD, PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE Dis-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA: THE FIRST TEN MONTHS, 69-73 (1972) (preventive deten-
tion law invoked against only 20 of 6,000 felony defendants due in part to
prosecutorial reluctance to become involved in lengthy and evidence-divulging
preventive detention hearing and the requirement of an expedited trial). The
preventive detention was requested only once by prosecutors in 1974. J. ROTH
& P. WICE, supr note 336, at 1-33. In 1977, prosecutors requested preventive
detention in only 40 cases out of a possible 1,500. Id
388. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1333-37 (D.C. 1981).
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(other than the Speedy Trial Act) on the period of detention,
and requiring a higher standard of proof on the critical issue of
threat to the community - would ameliorate defects in the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 in two respects. First, such
procedures should reduce the number of unnecessary deten-
tions, in the same way that these procedures limited detentions
in the District of Columbia. s1 9 Second, careful procedures high-
light the difficulty of proving threat to the community and the
lack of an alternative to detention, thereby protecting the prin-
ciples of liberty. In comparison, the Federal Bail Reform Act's
findings of probable cause 390 and dangerousness seem inade-
quate to protect individual liberty.391
The federal government should employ other procedures
to help generate balanced detention decisions. Faithful adher-
ence to procedural due process would require that federal pros-
ecutors present evidence similar to that presented at trial and
that the statute or the courts specify the kinds of evidence re-
quired to find dangerousness. Prosecutors should produce the
witnesses it offers to support a finding of dangerousness, and
the court should give the defendant the opportunity to cross-ex-
amine them. The evidence necessary to justify detention
should include specific acts of violence, and the court should
find specifically that all other conditions of release will fail to
serve the purposes of detention.
To further the goals of the speedy trial clause, the govern-
ment should enforce strict limitations on the period of deten-
tion, thus placing a burden on the prosecution to proceed
quickly to trial. Furthermore, due process calls for elimination
of the provision in the Federal Bail Reform Act that allows
prosecutors to present evidence of other crimes by hearsay, not
subject to cross-examination. 392 Congress should also eliminate
the provision that allows the government to offer information
through an Assistant United States Attorney by a proffer of ev-
idence393 without opportunity for confrontation.
389. Zimring & Hawkins, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice, 85 MICH.
L. REv. 481, 506 (1986); P. WICE, supra note 202, at 2-5.
390. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117-19 (1971).
391. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 558-65 (discussing Act's failure to ade-
quately address substantive due process problems).
392. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) (1988).
393. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(a) & (b) (1988). Despite this provision, courts
have held that discretion lies with the district court to accept evidence by live
testimony or proffer. See, e.g., United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d
Cir. 1985).
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2. Inconsistent Decisionmaking Under the Federal Bail
Reform Act of 1984
One would expect vague detention standards to generate
inconsistent detention decisions. The initial evidence about ac-
tual detention practice in various federal districts under the
Bail Reform Act indicates substantial inconsistency in deten-
tion decisions.394
One government study showed an increase in the total per-
centage of defendants detained from twenty-six percent under
the prior law to thirty-one percent of all federal defendants ar-
rested since the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 became effec-
tive.395 Thus, the detention of federal defendants increased
almost twenty percent. Of those detained, authorities held
about half for failure to pay money bail and the other half
under the new detention provisions.396 The study compared
districts in Indiana, Arizona, Florida, and New York.397 The to-
tal percentage of defendants detained increased in three dis-
tricts, but decreased in one.s3 8
In addition, the percentage of defendants detained for fail-
ure to pay money bail - one-hundred percent of those detained
under prior law - decreased by widely varying amounts in the
four districts.399 Under the Bail Reform Act, the government
did not detain any defendants for failure to pay money bail in
the Northern District of Indiana, but the percentage of those
detained for failure to pay money bail dropped by only sixteen
percent - from one-hundred percent to eighty-four percent of
all defendants detained - in the Southern District of
Florida.4o
The Bail Reform Act prohibits the government from using
a financial condition to justify pretrial detention.4°1 The deten-
tion of defendants on the forbidden basis of inability to pay
their money bail is, however, still evident in some of the test
districts. In two of these districts - the Northern District of
394. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 18-23.
395. Id- at 18.
396. IM at 27, figure 2.2.
397. The districts were the Northern District of Indiana, the District of Ar-
izona, the Southern District of Florida, and the Eastern District of New York.
Id at 2.
398. IH at 18, 20, table 2.6.
399. I at 23.
400. Id
401. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1988). See United States v. Holloway, 781 F.2d
124, 126 (8th Cir. 1986).
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Indiana and the Eastern District of New York - instances of
detention for failure to pay bail decreased sharply,402 but in the
other two districts - the District of Arizona and the Southern
District of Florida - a higher percentage of defendants for
whom money bail was set were unable to meet it.4°3 These
figures suggest that some judges may still be using money bail
to seek sub-rosa detention in some instances.
The most important lesson from these figures, however, is
the extreme inconsistency in bail practice among the four dis-
tricts studied. This inconsistency suggests the failure of the
1984 Act to guide detention practice in a principled manner.
Given the prohibition on the use of money bail to detain, the
1984 Act certainly reads as providing greater equality in the de-
tention decision, and some districts have obviously achieved
that goal. Similarly, the Act's presumption for conditions of re-
lease over detention reads as restricting prior detention prac-
tice, despite the expansion of the possible grounds for
detention. Congress's failure - in rejecting many of the key
procedures in the District of Columbia Act model - to provide
adequate procedures for detention, however, has apparently al-
lowed federal judges and magistrates to be governed less by law
and more by their discretion and the recommendations of
prosecutors. 40
3. Shifting the Burden of Detention
Methods other than changing the procedures at the deten-
tion hearing may exist to produce principled detention practice.
This Article refers to such procedural changes as shifting the
burden of detention to distinguish them from the burdens of
proof and persuasion that attach to particular facts at the de-
tention hearing.4°5
Scholars have evaluated judicial release and bail decisions
and considered ways to increase the level of release through ju-
dicial rules or training.406 Less well considered is how to en-
402. Defendants detained for failure to pay decreased from 32% of those of-
fered money bail to 0% in the Northern District of Indiana and from 70% to
3% in the Eastern District of New York. GAO STUDY, supra note 335, at 25,
26, table 2.6.
403. Defendants detained for failure to pay money bail increased from 27%
of those offered money bail to 33% in the District of Arizona and from 44% to
48% in the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 26, table 2.3.
404. Ebbesen & Konecni, supra note 109, at 819-20.
405. See supra Part II.
406. See Nagel, Discretion in the Criminal Justice System- Analyzing,
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courage prosecutorial behavior not to 'seek unnecessary
detention. Under the current 'federal system and many state
systems, obtaining detention has relatively few costs for the
government.4 07 Thus, the government has little incentive to
move quickly toward trial once it obtains a detention order. In
fact, the incentives may run in the opposite direction because
the time spent in detention may encourage defendants to pleadguilty.40s
One cost levied against the government involves the kind
of evidence and level of proof required to justify detention.
Those systems that require the proof of particular, specified
dangerous acts or offenses at a higher level than mere probable
cause increase the government's burden. Accordingly, the use
of detention is limited to the more serious cases. Another cost
to the government is the requirement that prosecutors
promptly provide information about the case to the defendant,
disclosing prosecution strategy and shortening the time to trial.
These costs, however, fall on the government as an abstract en-
tity, and do not place a particular "burden of detention" on the
individual prosecutor requesting detention.
Commentators have not explored other ways of making the
government responsible for unnecessary detention. As an ex-
ample, the government might pay a fixed amount per day to de-
tained defendants whom the court subsequently acquits or
against whom the state dismisses all charges.409 Writers have
proposed that the government compensate those convicted and
sentenced who serve time and are subsequently absolved of
Channeling, Reducing, and Controlling It, 31 EMORY L.J. 603, 611-12 & n.l1
(1982).
407. Freed and Wald specified four "rights" of every detained defendant:
(1) prompt and adequate bail review; (2) detention facilities separate from the
general prison population; (3) a speedy trial; and if convicted, (4) credit for
time served before sentence. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 36, at 86-90.
While the last condition is now mandated by federal law, see supra note 205,
the other conditions remain essentially unfulfilled.
408. Studies suggest that time in detention has a tendency to promote
guilty pleas. See Thaler, supra note 33, at 555-59.
409. The remedy of false imprisonment does not apply to cases in which
the judge imposes detention for a charge, but the court thereafter acquits the
defendant or the state dismisses the charge. Even if such a remedy existed,
false imprisonment generally requires proof of extraordinary violations and
motives. See Strong v. City of Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 564, 568, 157 N.W.2d 619,
621-22 (1968); Annotation, Delay in Taking Before Magistrate or Denial of Op-
portunity to Give Bail as Supporting Action for False Imprisonment, 98
A.L.R. 2D 966, 970-71 (1960).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
guilt through some extraordinary circumstance. 410 If this prin-
ciple makes sense for innocent individuals improperly punished
after trial, it should be extended to the much greater number
of people whom the state charges, detains, but later finds not
guilty. Laying aside the practical implications, the concept is
clear enough: Detention will cost the government money if it is
not justified subsequently by a conviction on a charge that orig-
inally justifed the detention.
Another way to increase the burden of detention would be
to pay detainees an amount sufficient to hire a private attorney.
The theory supporting such a provision would be that the guar-
antee of private counsel would balance the burden that deten-
tion places on trial and representation rights.411 Political
support for this idea would undoubtedly be hard to obtain, but
the point of this discussion is not political feasibility. Rather,
the point is the idea of making the government feel the burden
of detention in proportion to the burden felt by the detained
defendant in each case.
A detained defendant has a continuing interest in liberty.
This interest increases over time because extended detention
interferes with a fair trial and with the defendant's ability to
deal with family and employment. One obvious limitation on
detention would be a sharp time limit. The defendant could be
guaranteed a right to trial within very short time periods -
perhaps fourteen to thirty days - even for serious offenses. If
the state desires longer periods of detention, Congress might
create a detention system that recognizes the ongoing liberty
interest and increasing burden of detention through mandating
frequent rehearings with new burdens of detention on the gov-
ernment. For example, a detained defendant might, as a mat-
ter of right, receive a hearing on his or her detention status
before a magistrate every two weeks. At each hearing the pre-
sumption could be for release unless the government could con-
tinue to prove the adequacy of the grounds for detention. The
federal scheme might require the government to move from a
standard requiring a preponderance of the evidence, to one de-
manding clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's con-
tinuing threat to the community. The government might also
have to show reasonable progress towards trial at each hearing
or identify delay attributable solely to the defendant. Finally,
at the initial hearing and at subsequent hearings, the court
410. See, e.g., Day of Reckoning, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at D9, col. 3.
411. See infra notes 451-54 and accompanying text.
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might adopt a provision like that in the Federal Bail Reform
Act of 1984, and require the government to show that no con-
ditions of release or less punitive detention would satisfy the
purposes of detention.4'3
These suggestions may not be practical. They may cause
too many other problems at other points in the system. They
may be too expensive or politically unfeasible. They suggest,
however, ways in which the grave burden that detention im-
poses on the individual could be reflected in the burden the
government bears for each detention decision. Rules such as
these would place a burden on the government to match the
burden placed on the individual and, therefore, might lead to a
more careful and balanced set of detention decisions under any
stated purpose of detention.
C. INDEPENDENT VALUES
A third element distinguishing detention systems is the
role of independent values - such as a presumption of inno-
cence4 m4 and rights to trial, speedy trial, and representation -
that necessarily limit the impact of detention. A detention sys-
tem without these principles is very different from a system in
which some or all are present. When they are both present and
strong - propositions that are arguably true in this country -
detention must remain what Chief Justice Rehnquist called it
in SaZerno: an exception.4 ' 5
1. Presumption of Innocence
The time may have already passed when the presumption
412. Federal law provides that defendants shall be released on personal re-
cognizance or on an unsecured bond. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) & (b) (1988). If
the two preceding alternatives are believed to be inadequate, the defendant
can be released subject to release conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (1988), unless
"no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the com-
munity." 18 U.S.C. § 1342(e) (1988).
413. See Note, Limiting, supra note 45, at 335-37.
414. The presumption of innocence is intimately related to the rights to a
speedy trial and to counsel. Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 958 n.7 (3d Cir. 1980)
(en banc) (the right to counsel and speedy trial clauses, when read together
with the bail clause of the eighth amendment creates a federally protected in-
terest in reducing pretrial incarceration and minimizing interference with a
pretrial detainee's liberty). Together, these rights protect the fact-finding pro-
cess and, thereby, the legitimacy of the entire criminal process.
415. See supra note 1.
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of innocence has become the presumption of guilt.4' 6 Many
people assume that virtually all accused defendants are guilty
and believe, therefore, that punishment should begin immedi-
ately upon arrest and indictment.417 Police and prosecutors, as
well as the public, often voice the suspicion that if the police
arrest someone, he or she must be guilty - if not of the crime
charged, then of some other offense.4' s Former Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese, a career prosecutor, has expressed publicly
the view that suspects are usually guilty or else police would
not arrest them.419 Under this view, the conviction validates
the prior punishment, and if the court subsequently finds the
individual not guilty, he or she must have escaped conviction on
a technicality. If the state detains the accused before trial and
later dismisses the charges, some people shrug and say that the
state legitimately punished the accused for past crimes commit-
ted by the accused but for which the police had not arrested
him or her or been unable to convict.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
presumption of innocence is "constitutionally rooted,"420 that it
is "axiomatic and elementary, and that its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."'421
Courts generally view the presumption as growing from the
possibility of mistaken arrest or prosecution.422 The presump-
416. See Ordover, Balancing the Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence:
Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 137 (1989); Thaler, supra
note 33, at 442; H. PACKER, supra note 193, at 160-62.
417. Ordover, supra note 416, at 148; Project, The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals: A Survey of Recent Case Law, Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Grounds for Reversal?, 32 How. L.J. 163, 170 (1989).
418. Project, supra note 417, at 408 n.86.
419. See Ripston, So Much for the Hallowed Presumption of Innocence,
L.A. Daily Journal, Dec. 11, 1985, at 4, col. 4. In a recent interview, reporters
asked Meese whether criminal suspects, who are presumed innocent, should
be informed of their rights. 1d. His reply- "Suspects who are innocent of
crime should. But the thing is, you don't have many suspects who are inno-
cent of a crime. That's contradictory. If a person is innocent of a crime, he is
not a suspect." Id. When Attorney General Meese faced an accusation of vio-
lating ethical and legal rules, his lawyer took a vigorous, contrary position,
blasting the press and public for following "[t]he current fashion" by "as-
sum[ing] that anyone indicted is guilty." Lewis, Meese Deserves Justice, not
Abuse, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1988, at 21, col. 2. Meese's lawyer wrote: "There
was a time, not too long ago, when you could be considered a criminal only
after you had been charged in an indictment, a jury returned a verdict and a
court of appeals upheld the fairness of the proceeding." Id.
420. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam).
421. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
422. See Campell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 529 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978). To
focus only on the innocent is to misunderstand the purpose of the presumption
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tion is a requirement that the state presume a criminal defend-
ant to be innocent until it proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; the state cannot punish a defendant until it meets this
standard of proof.
This principle "has a status in our criminal law of primor-
dial origin."42 Its history can be traced from Deuteronomy
through Roman law, English common law, and the common
law of the United States.424 The presumption is meaningless,
however, unless it imposes real limits on a government seeking
to treat suspects like convicted criminals.425 In other words, it
must do more than just provide certain protections on the path
to final judgment at trial, or else the state can simply treat the
innocent as guilty and avoid the trouble of trial altogether.4 26
The presumption of innocence appears most often in cases
involving evidentiary rules at trial, jury instructions on the bur-
den of proof, or substantive limits on the treatment of defend-
ants at trial such as forbidding the defendant's appearance in
court in a prison uniform or shackled.42 7 The common ele-
of innocence. The state should have the same burdens when prosecuting a
"clearly" guilty defendant as when prosecuting a close case. A steady and ter-
rifying stream of stories about innocent individuals convicted of serious crimes
(and in some cases sentenced to death) illustrates the complexity involved in
recreating and judging uncertain events. The criminal system can eliminate
false convictions only if it presumes all defendants are innocent.
423. State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 213, 432 A.2d 912, 917 (1981) (jury in-
structions on meaning of presumption required).
424. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453. The presumption of innocence is so "funda-
mental" that its reach can be overstated and used for some rather florid, unan-
chored legal prose. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 338 N.W.2d 104, 107 (S.D. 1983)
(Henderson, J., dissenting) (presumptions of guilt were and are found in fas-
cist and tyrannical cultures led by Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Ho Chi Minh,
and Ayatollah Khomeini). This observation is not meant to offend but rather,
to note the tendency of such general and fundamental principles, especially
those with hazy but ancient historical anchors, to become the focus of rather
broad and, in the end, unconvincing arguments.
425. Justice Jackson observed in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951), that
"[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of inno-
cence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."
426. If society views the presumption of innocence as only an ideal that it
maintains despite the "reality" of guilty defendants, the presumption reverses
from one designed to protect individuals to one that justifies processes which
decrease the possibility of innocence and inevitably leads to a finding of guilt.
Such a societal view leads to acceptance of wholesale plea bargaining or inade-
quate representation.
427. See, e.g., State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 365-66, 226 S.E.2d 353, 366-67
(1976) (citing an extensive list of cases that hold that defendant is entitled to
appear at trial free of bonds and shackles); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 531-41 (1976) (detailing the various issues that arise during pretrial
detention).
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ments in these cases include the idea that the state should not
treat or label the accused as guilty and, beyond that, the idea
that the jury or judge should understand that the state carries a
heavy burden of proof in all cases.
One court's view that seems to capture much of the sub-
stantive bite of the presumption is that "courts must be alert to
factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding pro-
cess."428 Applying this idea aids in identifying the threat pre-
trial detention poses to the presumption of innocence.
Detention undermines the fairness of the criminal process
in numerous ways. The state's assumption of guilt inherent in
detaining before trial becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those
detained are more likely to plead guilty, to be convicted if tried,
and to receive a prison sentence.49 Conversely, those released
are less likely to plead guilty.430 In New York's lower criminal
courts, defendants detained before trial or plea will likely meet
their defense counsel only briefly before their first hearing in
court, and at later stages in the process, they often must deal
with different legal aid or appointed attorneys.431
To the extent that detention carries heavy "indicia of guilt"
or otherwise interferes with the possibility of conducting a full
defense, it may be analogous to the principles underlying the
case law prohibiting indicia of guilt at trial. The Constitution
forbids the state from clothing, handling, or portraying a de-
fendant as if he or she is guilty.432 These concerns must extend
beyond the physical bounds of the courtroom if the presump-
tion of innocence is not to be reduced to formalism.
Fidelity to the presumption of innocence should result in
as little curtailment of liberty before trial as possible. This cur-
tailment appropriately includes limited detention at a precinct
for processing. It extends through a prompt appearance before
a magistrate. Detention may be extended through trial to pro-
428. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976).
429. Evidence of these effects originated in the early 1960s. See McGinnis
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 281-83 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); VERA INSTI-
TUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS iN CRumNAL JUSTICE REFORM; TEN-YEAR REPORT
1961-1971 31 (1972); Ares, Rankin & Sturz, supra note 289, at 84-86; Ranldn,
supra note 289, at 643. More recent evidence confirms that pretrial detention
continues to carry a burden far beyond the period of detention itself. See e.g,
J. ROTH & P. WICE, s upra note 336, at IV-23 to IV-26; L. SHERWOOD-FABRE,
supra note 64, at 5-7.
430. Nagel, Policy Evaluation and Criminal Justice, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV.
53, 67 (1983).
431. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 70, at 751-60.
432. See supra note 153.
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tect the integrity of the trial process, including the assurance of
the suspect's appearance at trial. The standards required of
government - standards of probable cause for arrest,4 33 prob-
able cause for detention pending trial,434 and the numerous
standards imposed on the trial process, including the funda-
mental provision of counsel to those charged with serious crime
who cannot afford counsel - protect individuals from each
of these substantial incursions on liberty.
Society is always tempted to cut back on the protection
that these principles afford - especially the protections ema-
nating from principles that lack an express basis in the Consti-
tution. The protections that the presumption of innocence
affords are particularly tenuous. The accused often have crimi-
nal records, the evidence of guilt may seem strong in a particu-
lar case, and the accused frequently have different backgrounds
and lifestyles than those arresting, prosecuting, and judging
them. Additionally, the state often finds that the suspect is in
fact guilty of some offense.
2. Right to Trial
In the context of limiting federal collateral review proceed-
ings, the Supreme Court emphasized the central importance of
the trial in the determination of guilt.43 Yet the willingness to
resort to pretrial detention on the grounds of expected future
crimes indicates a general lessening of the belief in the trial as
the key process for determining guilt. Because prosecutors and
defendants at both state and federal levels dispose of the vast
majority of crimes by plea, very few trials occur, and the role of
the trial as a symbol has correspondingly diminished.43 7
Recognizing this fact, lawmakers have extended some of
the procedural protections provided at trial to the pretrial pro-
cess. Judicial decisions and legislative acts recognize the critical
433. See, eg., Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 217 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
434. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 749 (1962); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1988); FED. R. CR]M. P. 5(c).
435. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
436. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
437. The percentage of cases resolved by pleas is around 90% in the federal
system, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 35
(1990), and even higher in some state systems. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 71, at
510 (89% of felony offenses settled by pleas nationwide in 1986). In New York
City, well over 90% of cases are resolved by pleas. Alschuler, The Defense At-
torney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1206 n.84 (1975).
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and often determinative value of events that occur at arrest, in
the police station, and in lockup.438 The increase in detention
and the corresponding derogation of the value of liberty before
trial run directly counter to the broader understanding that jus-
tice does indeed turn on the treatment and respect shown the
individual before a trial begins. Importantly, pretrial detention
conflicts not only with the criminal trial process, but also with
a proceduralized quick disposition process. The ability to meet
with lawyers and collect evidence is even more important in
the short and pressured time span of a plea-centered system.
The trends toward the disparagement of the criminal trial
and toward providing trial-like protections to non-trial settings
are partially consistent. Disparagement of the criminal trial
may reflect a belief that the trial itself is not so important; the
overwhelming use of plea bargaining in many systems encour-
ages this view. Accordingly, extending trial-like paradigms to
pretrial procedures is an effort to retain important trial
concepts.
The disparagement of the criminal trial and the increase in
pretrial procedures can work, however, to transfer real protec-
tions into paper shields. Lack of time, intense pressures, and
uncertainty inherently limit the pretrial process. An increase
in procedural protections may not relieve these limitations. In-
stant justice is an oxymoron; justice involves some degree of re-
search, examination, presentation, thought, and principled,
public resolution. A pretrial trial fits none of these
requirements.
3. Speedy Trial
Some people view the provision of a speedy trial as the
turning point of the detention debate. 43 9 The inability to pro-
vide the quick, fair trial mandated by the Bill of Rights is un-
doubtedly one of the greatest failures of America's modern
criminal justice system. Some argue that the concern with pre-
trial detention is in reality a concern with the inability to pro-
vide a speedy trial and conclude that if the state in fact
provided a speedy trial, the concern with detention would
438. Thaler, supra note 33, at 479-80 (e.g., extension of right to counsel ear-
lier in process, including lineups).
439. People who see the delay in trials as the core detention problem argue
that if trials were in fact provided quickly, detention would be less of a con-
cern, and conversely, slowing, failing court systems have unduly exacerbated
the detention problem. Godbold, Speedy Trial - Major Surgery for a Na-
tional i71, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265, 288-89 (1972).
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largely disappear.44 0 Closer examination reveals quite the op-
posite: a bitter tension between speedy trial and detention
works to deprive defendants of more rights than they would
lose in the absence of speedy trials or the presence of detention
alone.
Detention pending a quick trial could lead to enormous
pressures to forgo rights and create real, substantial impedi-
ments to conducting a minimally adequate defense. Speedy tri-
als could generate even less well-founded pleas because
detention impairs the ability to prepare for trial.Ml Detainees,
therefore, may need more time to prepare for trial than indi-
viduals who are on release. Although properly enforced speedy
trial requirements should penalize the government whenever it
is not proceeding diligently toward trial, the detainee must be
able to waive his or her right to a speedy trial upon a showing
of need for more preparation.
The foregoing discussion does not denigrate the importance
of speedy trials. The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial
should impose some limit on pretrial detention.4 Jurisdictions
should adopt time limitations stricter for those detained than
for defendants at liberty.44 3 In the federal system, the limits of
the Speedy Trial Act"4 do little to diminish the impact of pre-
440. We do not suggest that we are opponents of speedy trial rights. In
fact, we think debate over detention can invigorate speedy trial jurisprudence.
Those concerned that the new jurisprudence of pretrial detention further er-
odes the fundamental principles of criminal law that protect citizens' basic
freedoms might focus not only on detention reform, but also on providing
truly speedy trials to all defendants. Isolation of elements of the criminal jus-
tice system, such as detention, ignores the other important elements. Reform
must take account of all elements of complex criminal justice systems.
We also reject cynicism about the ability to provide speedier trials. Pow-
erful evidence suggests that trials of even serious offenses could in fact occur
at a radically faster pace then they do at present. Vera Institute of Justice
studies show that felony trials in New York could go to trial in weeks if police
properly applied their resources. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supm note 429,
at 137-41.
441. See, ag., Perry v. Mitchell, 253 Ga. 593, 322 S.E.2d 273 (1984) (delay
hurts detained defendants).
442. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436-37 (1973); Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (the
right to a speedy trial "depends upon circumstances").
443. See AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL
RELEASE § 5.10 (1986). About half of the states with detention provisions for
"dangerous" defendants provide additional speedy trial guarantees as part of
the detention law, while the other half apply only the general speedy trial pro-
visions. B. GOTLnEB, supm note 65, at 15.
444. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
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trial detention.445 A number of states also have speedy trial
provisions, but many state defendants still spend substantial
amounts of time in jail before trial, even for relatively minor
offenses.4
The movement toward increased detention has opened up
new possibilities for constitutional claims under the speedy trial
clause. The length of detention raises due process concerns
separate from the grounds for detention.447 The Court's new
reliance in Salerno448 on the Speedy Trial Act's "stringent time
limitations" on the length of pretrial detention 449 may lead to a
new and proper jurisprudence of speedy trials. In the past,
speedy trial challenges had to demonstrate government viola-
tion of the constitutional boundaries of the right to trial, but
now they need only address the right not to be detained before
trial. Thus, pretrial detainees have a new and powerful reason
to argue that the language of the fifth amendment guarantees
them a truly speedy trial - even more stringent than the limits
of the Speedy Trial Act.45°
4. Right to Representation
The higher conviction rates for those detained reflect in
part a detained defendant's reduced ability to assist counsel in
trial preparation.451 Having the assistance of counsel must
mean more than the mere presence of an attorney in a hearing
or at trial. A defendant can do many things in preparing a de-
fense that an attorney - especially an overwhelmed public de-
fender - simply will not be able to do. Examples include
searching for witnesses and collecting evidence.
In upholding federal laws governing seizure of assets, the
Supreme Court recently rejected the notion that the sixth
amendment includes the right of defendants to choose which
445. See Alschuler, supra note 31, at 516.
446. SouRcEBooK, supra note 71, at 525.
447. Chief Judge Feinberg concurring in MeLendez-Carrion argued that de-
tention for eight months based on a finding of dangerousness violated due pro-
cess. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1009 (2d Cir. 1986).
448. See supra notes 106-26 and accompanying text.
449. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988).
450. But see United States v. Montalyo-Murillo, 110 S. Ct. 2072 (1990) (fail-
ure to follow the time requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) to conduct a judicial
hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of release condi-
tions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at trial or the public's
safety does not require the detainee's release).
451. See supra note 431; see also Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 435, 613
P.2d 210, 215, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 154 (1980).
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attorney they want.452 This holding should make the state even
more hesitant to needlessly detain defendants. In a world in
which criminal defendants must use overburdened government
counsel, preventing them (through detention) from meeting
with the attorney and from working on their own defense
seems particularly unfair. The inability to interact meaning-
fully with counsel impedes the notion of a substantial right to
counsel. Many defendants choose instead to exercise their right
to present their own defense.453 This phenomenon is particu-
larly apparent in the urban criminal court setting.4-
D. ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
The state may use various forms of release, various forms
of detention, or combinations of the two to obtain the objectives
of detention.45 "Detention," however, connotes imprisonment.
Even assuming the goal of detention is to avoid pretrial crime,
the government has an array of means to keep an eye on a de-
fendant without placing him or her in the distinctly punitive
setting of jail.4 56 Widely accepted alternatives include home de-
tention,457 detention in a community facility,4 5s and supervised
452. Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2652 (1989).
453. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-36 (1975).
454. In Atlanta, for example, defendants - charged with crimes ranging
from violation of city ordinances to state felonies - are not asked until the
first hearing whether they want an attorney. The vast majority do not appear
at the first hearing with an attorney and then often reject public counsel -
even in the face of the judge's persistent advice to the contrary - because ac-
cepting counsel means returning to detention, even if only for a day. The
power of detention is evident as defendant after defendant, although charged
with serious offenses, insists on representing himself at the preliminary hear-
ing.
Professor Marc Miller, a co-author of this Article, has made the preceding
observations of the Atlanta Municipal Court system while head of the Atlanta
Muncipal Court Project.
455. This area most directly raises questions about money bail. Money bail
is, of course, the traditional way of guaranteeing appearance at trial. The
question for purposes of this Section, however, would be whether money bail
can serve the other purposes of detention.
456. See Note, Limiting, supra note 45, at 323-27.
457. See generally P. HOFER & B. MEJERHOEFEI, HOME CoNFIEMENT 14
(Federal Judicial Center 1987); see also United States v. Traitz, 807 F.2d 322,
325 (3d Cir. 1986) (approving restrictive "home incarceration" under Bail Re-
form Act on basis of dangerousness). In a widespread development in both
state and federal jurisdictions, authorities are using various forms of home
confinement with electronic monitoring to keep track of a defendant's wherea-
bouts and behavior. See P. HoFER & B. MEIERHOEFER, supra, at 36-40. These
highly intrusive programs raise their own substantial questions of deprivation
of liberty, but used for short periods within proper guidelines, they are vastly
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release.459 A broad incarcerative detention policy inherently
limits experimentation because the government is not moti-
vated to find alternative ways to achieve the same ends.
The notion of alternatives other than detention in jail fo-
cuses once again on the central question of who bears the bur-
den of detention: the government or the individual. If the
government had a sharply reduced power to detain, it would
undoubtedly find other ways to protect society.48° For example,
in the Buckey case,46 ' the government could have found alter-
native ways to protect the public generally, and young children
in particular, from the defendant. Prosecutors could have
moved to prohibit the defendant from working in any school or
other environment where children are present. The court
could have prohibited Buckey from being around children at all
times, enforcing this order by requiring him to spend evening
and weekend hours at home or in a community detention
facility.462
preferable to jail, enabling the defendant to receive counsel, prepare a case,
and maintain a substantial degree of family and work support. Such programs
often make sense in terms of public policy because the cost of short-term in-
carceration is so high, and in jurisdictions with no available jail space, these
options are in particular cases far preferable to court orders of release result-
ing from court-ordered limits on detention. Other ideas - including supervi-
sion tied to drug or alcohol treatment, less-supervised release, and daily drug
testing - may provide a range of ways in which the court can respond to the
particular concerns that would have motivated a decision to detain in the ab-
sence of such options.
458. See Harland & Harris, Developing and Implementing Alternatives to
Incarceratirm" A Problem of Planned Change in Criminal Justice, 1984 U. III-
L. REv. 319, 321.
459. VERA INSTrrTE OF JusTICE, supra note 429, at 140.
460. Michael E. Smith, director of the Vera Institute of Justice, has made
the same point regarding prisons. In the absence of prisons, society would
likely develop many alternative ways to punish, incapacitate, deter, and re-
form offenders.
461. See supra notes 3-28 and accompanying text.
462. In fact, when the court released Buckey - on $1.5 million bail five
years after his arrest - the court imposed severe conditions of release. Judge
Places Severe Restrictions Covering Release For Buckey, L.A. Times, Feb. 11,
1989, part II, at 1, col. 4. The conditions were as follows: Buckey could not
contact any of the victims in the case or their families; he could not leave the
state without the court's permission; he had to relinquish his passport; he
could not have any verbal or physical contact with any person under age 14
who was not a blood relative or accompanied by a parent; Buckey could not
enter the cities of Manhattan Beach, Redondo Beach, or Hermosa Beach with-
out the court's permission; he could not consume any alcohol; and authorities
must keep him under 24-hour guard. 1d. These conditions would certainly
have been equally effective five years earlier, and they are equally effective
regardless of whether they are backed by $1.5 million bail.
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In some cases, a court identifies a "threat to the commu-
nity" as the basis for the detention of a defendant charged with
a nonviolent crime. These cases are particularly disturbing and
expose the punitive nature of the detention because alternative
forms of protection are so readily available. For example, in
1988 a federal magistrate in California refused to release on bail
a twenty-five year old suspected computer hacker who alleg-
edly entered a National Security Agency computer and planted
a false story on a financial news wire.4 The magistrate con-
cluded that no "conditions the court could set up" could ensure
that "the defendant would be anything other than a danger to
the community."464 The defense attorney suggested home de-
tention and the removal of all computers with the disconnec-
tion of all phone lines. The magistrate responded, without
further explanation, that "the defendant could commit major
crimes no matter where he is."5
These cases are not extreme in at least one sense. Judges
at detention hearings commonly ignore the fact that detention
is the most severe limitation on individual liberty - barring
capital punishment - that society accepts. Pretrial conditions
are neither polar questions - in or out - nor three-way deci-
sions with traditional money bail as the third alternative.
Rather, the court may set a variety of conditions that raise con-
siderably less substantial constitutional concerns than deten-
tion.4 s Criminal justice systems across the country are
beginning to recognize a range of incapacitative alternatives467
463. Suspected Computer Hacker is Denied Bail, L.A. Times, Dec. 24,1988,
part H, at 1, col. 5. The defendant allegedly obtained the telephone billing in-
formation of the NSA and several of its employees. Id. The U.S. Attorney
made no allegations, however, that the defendant had access to classified data.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 6.
466. Some alternatives raise other constitutional concerns. Compare Abell,
Pretrial Drug Testing - Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 943, 948-56 (1989) (dismissing constitutional concerns),
with Rosen & Goldkamp, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing at the Bail
Stage, 80 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 114, 175 (1989) (finding constitutional
problems).
467. Some states and localities have begun to implement pretrial control al-
ternatives. Experiments conducted by the Vera Institute of Justice in New
York led to the first great reform of the federal bail system in the early 1960s,
culminating in the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966. Clarke, Pretrial Release:
Concepts, Issues, and Strategies for Improvement, in 3 RESEARCH IN CORREC-
TIONS 1 (1988). The Vera Institute of Justice is now experimenting with the
use of supervised release settings for defendants who would otherwise likely
be detained. See generally VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NASSAU BAIL BOND AGENCY 13-14 (1989) (dis-
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that are both less expensive than jail,4  and more protective of
individual liberty.
Due process of law requires an increased use of such alter-
natives. Conditions of release - even quite restrictive condi-
tions - pose a lesser threat to individual liberty than detention
in secure state facilities. The differences in the ability of the
defendant to work, maintain a family life, and prepare for the
defense of criminal charges are substantial.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 contains a presumption in
favor of release on whatever conditions will guarantee appear-
ance at trial and protection of the community. This presump-
tion needs currently unavailable standards and programs to
enforce it, but the idea behind the presumption is proper. As
bail practice continues to expand and become more sophisti-
cated, the greater availability of non-incarcerative alternatives
may substantially lessen the government's desire to detain de-
fendants in prison. Keeping suspects out of jail also sustains a
meaningful notion of the presumption of innocence before trial.
CONCLUSION
Pretrial detention has a place in dealing with those accused
of serious crime, but lawmakers must keep it within proper
limits. All legal systems recognize some level of detention;
thus, the question is not whether one is for or against deten-
tion, but rather where and how one draws the line.
In our view, the current trend in this country is extremely
dangerous and threatening to fundamental liberties. The pre-
ventive detention provisions in the Federal Bail Reform Act of
cussing criteria for supervised release). In this study, the court releases de-
fendants to the control and supervision of trained staff. Defendants begin
their release in a supervised residential setting, and then may return home if
they satisfy the requirements of the supervising program. Not only does this
allow for release in cases where detention would have occurred as a matter of
course, it also provides the opportunity for the court to receive information on
the defendant in a less artificial (and certainly a more positive) setting than
jail. Moreover, authorities can use the pretrial period to help the defendant
begin to deal with drug and alcohol (as well as employment and housing)
problems, preventing subsequent infringement on the punitive powers of the
court at the time of trial and sentencing. See, e.g., Freed, The Only Agreement
on Crime: No Easy Answers, L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1990, at Al, col. 5. The city
of San Joaquin Valley allows some felons to serve their sentences at home
rather than at jail.
468. See, e.g., Reed, No Easy Escape From Jail Dilemma, L.A. Times, July
2, 1990, at B1, col. 2 (Ventura Co. ed.) (listing less expensive alternatives to
jail, such as furlough, work release, and drug treatment programs).
[Vol. 75:335
PRETRIAL DETENTION
1984 and in many state acts are predicated on inaccurate as-
sumptions that tend to substantially overstate the amount of
pretrial crime sufficiently serious to justify detention. These
laws are based on assumptions that overstate the ability to
identify those who pose a threat. The inadequacy of the proce-
dures governing detention determinations compounds these
errors.
Saleno largely settled the broad federal constitutional is-
sues concerning preventive detention. Because the Supreme
Court has determined that it will not limit the use of pretrial
preventive detention, Congress must correct the errors in the
Bail Reform Act. Similarly, the responsibility shifts to state
courts and legislatures operating under their own constitutions
to develop sensible detention policies.
In recent years, federal authorities have emphasized the
traditional primacy of the states in designing and operating the
great bulk of the criminal justice system in this country. The
states are meeting the challenge with novel bail, detention, al-
ternative sentencing, drug treatment, and intervention pro-
grams. Pretrial detention presents a significant opportunity for
state and local legislatures to reject a flawed federal model and
develop principled, functional systems which themselves can
serve as models.
The fact that the new federal practice has passed constitu-
tional challenge on its face neither makes it more legitimate as
a matter of principle, nor shields the federal law against attack
in particular cases. The current federal situation - like the sit-
uation in states - is not immune to reform. Though not ideal,
the framework of detention can remain if the government em-
ploys proper standards and procedures. The effect of the laws
in such a world, however, would likely be much different.
The treatment of suspects before trial is one of the great
tests of a society's respect for individual liberty. A government
that presumes guilt will use detention to punish the suspect im-
mediately, and pay the cost in false convictions and destabiliza-
tion of the liberty interest that all members of society enjoy. A
society that insists on a presumption of innocence and lives up
to that commitment will detain individuals only when their re-
lease will circumvent the very process of ordered liberty.
This Article has considered and rejected the modern trend
toward increased detention based on inaccurate, unprovable
predictions of dangerousness. This trend is a subterfuge to un-
dermine the presumption of innocence. Regardless of the total
1990]
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number of detained individuals, lawmakers must find standards
and processes that operate to identify the particular individuals
whom the state should detain. Predictions of dangerousness
fail this requirement.
Something is needed to replace the misuse of predictions,
lack of basic procedures, and mischaracterization of detention.
This Article offers a theory of detention that accommodates
fundamental constitutional and jurisprudential principles, the
traditional grounds for detention, and the notion that the state
should detain certain highly criminous offenders whom it ar-
rests for serious offenses during a period of bail or release
pending trial on serious charges. If carefully developed, deten-
tion on these grounds will provide society with sufficient pro-
tection against those who continue to commit serious crimes
before trial.
